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The Supreme Court Review briefly summarizes the important
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ACTIONS AND DEFENSES
HANSEN V. FIRST AMERICAN BANK AND TRUST OF MINOT
In Hansen v. First American Bank and Trust of Minot,' the
North Dakota Supreme Court held that a defendant may amend
its answer to include an affirmative defense not raised in the initial
pleadings, if no prejudice to the plaintiff results.2
On June 9, 1987, Lynn Jackson Hansen filed an action against
First American Bank and Trust for breach of fiduciary duty in its
capacity as personal representative of her grandfather's estate.3
First American's answer did not include any affirmative defenses
to the claim.4 On July 14, 1988, the day of trial, First American
orally moved to amend its answer to assert several affirmative
defenses, including the defense that Hansen's action was barred by
the limitation period set forth in section 30.1-21-05 of the North
Dakota Century Code.' The trial court granted First American's
motion to amend and dismissed the action.6 Hansen appealed.7
Hansen cited Rule 8(c) of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure as authority for the proposition that an affirmative defense
is waived unless it is plead in the defendant's initial answer.'
Although the North Dakota Supreme Court agreed that failure to
plead an affirmative defense generally results in waiver, the court
stated that Rule 8(c) must also be read in conjunction with Rule
15(a) of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure when a motion
to amend is involved.9 Reading the two rules together, the court
concluded that an affirmative defense may be asserted in a later
amendment to the answer and allowed by the trial court, if the
1. 452 N.W.2d 770 (N.D. 1990).
2. Hansen v. First American Bank & Trust of Minot, 452 N.W.2d 770 (N.D. 1990).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 770-771.
5. Id. at 771. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-21-05 (1988) (requiring that actions against a
personal representative for breach of fiduciary duty be brought within six months after the
filing of the closing statement).
6. Hansen, 452 N.W.2d at 771.
7. Id.
8. Id. See N.D.R. Civ. P. 8(c) (affirmative defenses).
9. Hansen, 452 N.W.2d at 771-772.
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plaintiff is not prejudiced as a result."° The court, found that the
trial court gave ample opportunity to the plaintiff to prepare a
defense to the amendment. Therefore, the plaintiff was not
prejudiced by the trial court's decision."
The judgment of the trial court was affirmed.' 2
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE
MULLINS v. NORTH DAKOTA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN
SER VICES
In Mullins v. North Dakota Department of Human Services,'3
the North Dakota Supreme Court considered the consolidated
appeals of three individuals who had been denied services from
the developmental disabilities division. 4 The Department found
the individuals not entitled to services, pursuant to provisions of
the Department's service manual, which had not been adopted in
accordance with the North Dakota Administrative Agencies Prac-
tices Act (A.A.P.A.).' 5 The individuals contended that because the
manual had not been properly adopted, the Department erred in
determining eligibility for services under the manual provisions.16
The Department, on the other hand, argued the service manual
fell under an exception to the rulemaking requirement because it
dealt with internal management of the Department.' 7 The dis-
trict courts reversed the Department's denial of services to the
three individuals.'"
On appeal from the trial court's reversal, the North Dakota
Supreme Court determined that the service manual provisions
used to deny services to the individuals had not been adopted pur-
suant to the provisions of the North Dakota Administrative Agen-
cies Practices Act.' 9 Further, the court determined the service
manual provision did not fall under the internal management
exception to the A.A.P.A., as the Department argued, because the
provisions directly affected the substantive and procedural rights
10. Id. at 772.
11. Id. at 772-773.
12. Id. at 774.
13. 454 N.W.2d 732 (N.D. 1990).
14. Mullins v. North Dakota Dep't of Human Services, 454 N.W.2d 732 (N.D. 1990).
Also included in the appeal were the cases of Dolochek v. North Dakota Dept. of Human
Services and Leabo v. North Dakota Dep't of Human Services. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 733.
17. Id. at 734. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-01(6Xa) (Supp. 1989) (definition of a rule
does not include a matter concerning only internal management).
18. Mullins, 454 N.W.2d at 732.
19. Id. at 734.
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of the individuals.2 0 Making the determination that the service
manual provisions did not meet the requirements of the A.A.P.A.
or fall under the internal management exception, the court con-
cluded the manual provisions were invalid.2
The three judgments were remanded for redetermination of
the individuals' eligibility.2
APPEAL AND ERROR
DAKOTA BANK AND TRUST CO. v. BRAKKE
In Dakota Bank and Trust Co. v. Brakke,23 the issue was
whether a defendant, on appeal after a default judgment, could
raise, for the first time, the issue of proper notice of a pretrial con-
ference.24 Fenske Feed and Grain Co. (FFG) was scheduled to
appear at a pretrial conference in July of 1988.1 An affidavit indi-
cated that FFG had been sent an Order for Pretrial Conference by
registered and certified mail.2 6  FFG claimed that it did not
receive notice of the pretrial conference.2 A default judgment
was granted and FFG appealed.28 FFG did not fie a motion for
relief from the default judgment, but appealed the judgment to
the supreme court. 9
The supreme court noted that it would not consider an issue
on appeal when that issue had not been raised at the trial level.30
FFG should have filed a motion seeking relief under Rule 60(b) of
the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure.3' In this way FFG
could have presented facts and evidence that supported its con-
tention of no notice of pretrial conference.32 Since this evidence
was not available on appeal, the supreme court had no choice but
to affirm the default judgment.33
20. Id. at 734-735.
21. Id. at 735.
22. Id.
23. 452 N.W.2d 351 (N.D. 1990).
24. Dakota Bank & Trust Co. v. Brakke, 452 N.W.2d 351, 352 (N.D. 1990).
25. Id.
26. Id. FF0 had also been sent a supplemental order indicating that pro se litigants
must appear at this conference. Id. A signed returned receipt was received that indicated
that FFG had received this material. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 352, 353.
29. Brakke, 452 N.W.2d at 353.
30. Id. (citations omitted).
31. Id. See N.D.R. Civ. P. 60(b) (the rule provides that upon motion a party may obtain
relief from a judgment in certain situations, i.e., mistake, inadvertence, excusable neglect).
32. Brakke, 452 N.W.2d at 352.
33. Id.
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AUTOMOBILES
STATE V. WETZEL
In State v. Wetzel,34 the North Dakota Supreme Court held
that routine vehicle safety inspections conducted in a 'systematic
manner were reasonable under the fourth amendment.3"
Tom Wetzel's automobile was stopped by the North Dakota
State Highway Patrol for a routine safety inspection at a check-
point on a state highway.36 During the check, it was discovered
that Wetzel was driving without a valid license. Wetzel was
cited for driving while under suspension.38 Wetzel challenged the
stop as unconstitutional under the fourth amendment, claiming
that the patrolman exercised unconstrained discretion in stopping
vehicles.39 The trial court granted Wetzel's motion to suppress
the evidence obtained by the patrolman on the basis that the state
did not establish that the patrolman acted without such
discretion.4 °
Guided by a leading United States Supreme Court case, Dela-
ware v. Prouse,4 1 the North Dakota Supreme Court determined
that checkpoint inspections conducted in a reasonable and system-
atic manner do not violate an individual's fourth amendment
rights against unreasonable search and seizure.42 The patrolman
who inspected Wetzel's vehicle did not randomly stop vehicles for
inspection, but rather stopped a vehicle, inspected it, and pro-
ceeded to stop the next available vehicle for inspection, all in a
highly visible manner.4 3 The court found that this procedure was
sufficiently systematic to pass muster under the fourth amend-
ment.44 Balancing the interests of the state in vehicle safety
against the intrusiveness of the inspection into Wetzel's privacy
rights, the check point was determined by the court to be
reasonable.45
34. 456 N.W.2d 115 (N.D. 1990).
35. State v. Wetzel, 456 N.W.2d 115 (N.D. 1990).
36. Wetzel, 456 N.W.2d at 116.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 117.
40. Wetzel, 456 N.W.2d at 117.
41. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
42. Wetzel, 456 N.W.2d at 117-120. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979)
(thoroughly analyzes permissibility of procedures used in stopping vehicles for license or
safety checks under the fourth amendment).
43. Wetzel, 456 N.W.2d at 120.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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The suppression order of the county court was reversed.46
BANKRUPTCY
BINEK V. ZIEBARTH
In Binek v. Ziebarth 47 the issue was whether the automatic
stay provision of the bankruptcy code should apply to an appeal
from an order denying a debtor's motion to vacate a default judg-
ment.48 William Binek commenced an action against Silver Zie-
barth to recover legal fees.49 On September 2, 1987, an order for
default judgment was granted in favor of Binek.50 Ziebarth filed a
motion for relief from the default judgment.5 ' Ziebarth's motion
for relief from default judgement was denied. 2 On July 7, 1989,
he appealed the order denying his motion for relief of default
judgment.5 3 On December 22, 1989, Ziebarth fied a chapter 12
bankruptcy petition, and, because of this, asked for a stay of the
supreme court appeal.'
The automatic stay provision of the bankruptcy code prohibits
the continuation of a judicial action that was commenced before
the bankruptcy petition was filed.55 This stay does not apply to
actions brought by the debtor, but only actions against the
debtor.' Binek contended that Ziebarth's motion was initiated
for the benefit of the debtor.5 7 The supreme court stated that they
must look at who originally brought the action, and that determi-
nation is to be made at the inception of the case.m In this case the
initial action was brought by Binek against Ziebarth for collection
of legal fees.59 The motions brought by Ziebarth were immaterial
to the determination of who initiated the action.6 The supreme
46. Id. at 121.
47. 452 N.W.2d 327 (N.D. 1990).
48. Binek v. Ziebarth, 452 N.W.2d 327, 328 (N.D. 1990).
49. Id. at 327.
50. Id.
51. Id. Apparently Ziebarth filed a N.D.R.O.C. 3.2 motion for relief pursuant to N.D.R.
Civ. P. 60(b). Id. See N.D.R.O.C. 3.2 (criteria for filing a motion); N.D.R. Civ. P. 60(b)(providing that upon motion a party may obtain relief from a judgment in certain situations,
such as mistake, inadvertence, excusable neglect).
52. Binek, 452 N.W.2d at 327-28.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Binek, 452 N.W.2d at 328.
56. Id. (citing Kessel v. Peterson, 350 N.W.2d 603, 604 (N.D. 1984) (adopting the same
view expressed in a third circuit decision)).
57. Id.
58. Id. It does not matter whether the case had progressed to an appeal. Id.
59. Id.
60. Binek, 452 N.W.2d at 328.
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court held that this was "clearly an action against the debtor" 1
and must be stayed under 11 U.S.C. section 362.
BANKS AND BANKING
PRODUCTION CREDIT AssocIATIoN OF FARGO V. ISTA
In Production Credit Association of Fargo v. Ista, 2 Allen and
DeAnn Ista appealed from a judgment awarding $508,507.11 to
the Production Credit Association of Fargo (PCA) and dismissing
their counterclaim. 3 The Istas had been receiving financing for
their farming operations from PCA for over 30 years.64 In 1984,
due to unusual flooding, the Istas began to experience losses,
which continued through 1986.65 In 1986, PCA denied the Istas'
application for an operating loan.' PCA filed an action to fore-
close their security interests and sought a money judgment in
1987.67 The Istas filed an answer and counterclaim, alleging bad
faith and challenging PCA's security interest in certain crops.6
The trial court entered a partial summary judgment dismissing the
Istas' counterclaim and entered judgment for PCA.69 The Istas
appealed, claiming that PCA breached its fiduciary duty, acted in
bad faith, negligently handled their loans, and held invalid secur-
ity interests in certain crops.70
Two of the four issues raised on appeal were easily disposed of
by the North Dakota Supreme Court.7 ' The Istas contended that
PCA owed them a fiduciary duty as shareholders of PCA, yet cited
no authority to support their claim.7 2 The court, finding no sup-
port for the argument, held that without special circumstances, an
officer or director of a corporation only owes a duty to sharehold-
ers collectively, not to each individual shareholder.7 3 Next, the
court rejected the Istas' argument that PCA was negligent because
it did not ensure that the Istas had hail insurance on their 1986
crop.74 Finding that PCA did not advance operating funds to the
61. Id.
62. 451 N.W.2d 118 (N.D. 1990).
63. Production Credit Ass'n of Fargo v. Ista, 451 N.W.2d 118, 119-120 (N.D. 1990).
64. Id. at 120.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Ista, 451 N.W.2d at 120.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Ista, 451 N.W.2d at 120-121.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 125.
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Istas during that year, the court held that PCA had no duty to fur-
nish or finance such insurance.75
The Istas also raised the issue of whether they were entitled to
recover in tort for PCA's failure to consider them for administra-
tive forbearance under federal law, before denying their request
for a 1986 operating loan.76 The Istas contended that violation of
the federal regulations gave rise to a separate cause of action
under state tort law.77 Reviewing case law from various federal
circuits, the court concluded that a bad faith tort action under
state law could not be based upon a violation of the federal farm
credit act, when the act and its accompanying regulations imposed
no duty upon PCA.78
Finally, the court reviewed the Istas' assertion that the trial
court erred in holding that PCA had a valid security interest in
three years of crops by virtue of a 1985 security- agreement.79
Finding it appropriate to take the course of dealing into considera-
tion to interpret the contract, the court concluded that the lan-
guage of the agreement was ambiguous and raised a material issue
of fact.8 0 Therefore, the court held that summary judgment on the
issue of the security interest was inappropriate.8 '
The judgment foreclosing the security interests was reversed
and remanded, and in all other aspects, the judgment was
affirmed.8 -2
BROKERS
SCHMIDT V. FIRST NATIONAL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY
In Schmidt v. First National Bank and Trust Co.,83 the North
Dakota Supreme Court held that a real estate agent was not enti-
tled to recover a commission under the theory of quantum meruit
if he fails to fulfill the contract requirements.84
75. Id.
76. Ista, 451 N.W.2d at 122-125.
77. Id.
78. Id. See Smith v. Russellville Production Credit Ass'n, 777 F.2d 1544 (lth Cir.
1985) and Mendel v. Production Credit Ass'n of the Midlands, 862 F.2d 180 (8th Cir. 1988).
79. Ista, 451 N.W.2d at 125. In 1985, Ista executed a security agreement to PCA
covering "all crops grown and to be grown." Id. at 125-26. PCA contended that the
agreement gave them a security interest in crops grown by the Istas in 1986, 1987, and
1988. Id. The Istas asserted that their course of dealing with the bank for thirty years had
been that each security agreement executed to PCA only covered crops grown in that
particular growing season. Id.
80. Ista, 451 N.W.2d at 126-127.
81. Id. at 127.
82. Id.
83. 453 N.W.2d 602 (N.D. 1990).
84. Schmidt v. First Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., 453 N.W.2d 602 (N.D. 1990).
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In 1986, First National contacted several real estate agents,
including Bob Schmidt, to help seek a buyer for a shopping center
owned by the Bank.s5 Under an oral agreement, Schmidt was to
receive a commission if he found a buyer and consummated a
sale.86 Schmidt found a group of investors interested in the prop-
erty who submitted to First National $10,000 earnest money along
with a written option to purchase.8 7 The next day, another group
of investors submitted a higher offer, which was accepted by First
National.m The Bank returned the earnest money to the first
group of investors."' Schmidt subsequently filed an action against
First National, asserting that the bank owed him a commission for
bringing them a willing buyer or, alternatively, that by bringing a
buyer to the Bank, the Bank was able to get a higher offer from the
second group of investors, and Schmidt should receive a commis-
sion under the theory of quantum meruit. The trial court
entered summary judgment dismissing Schmidt's case, concluding
that he was not entitled to relief under either theory.9" Schmidt
appealed.92
The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the trial court's
summary judgment under the first theory of recovery.9 3 Review-
ing relevant case law, the court determined that actual completion
of the sale of the property is not always necessary for a broker to
recover a commission if a willing buyer is produced and that buyer
agrees to the seller's terms.94 This led the court to hold that genu-
ine issues of material fact existed as to whether a commission was
actually earned by Schmidt.95 Therefore, the trial court erred in
granting summary judgment. 6
On the second theory of recovery, the North Dakota Supreme
Court agreed with the trial court that Schmidt was not entitled to
recover under a theory of quantum meruit as a matter of law.9 7
The court concluded that the only recovery available to Schmidt
was that of a commission under the contract.98 The court
85. Schmidt, 453 N.W.2d at 603.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Schmidt, 453 N.W.2d at 604.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Schmidt, 453 N.W.2d at 604-605.
94. Id. at 604.
95. Id. at 605.
96. Id.
97. Schmidt, 453 N.W.2d at 605.
98. Id.
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explained that to allow a real estate agent to recover in quantum
meruit when he fails to earn a commission under a contract, would
open a Pandora's box of nonmeritorius claims.99
The judgment of the trial court was affirmed in part, reversed
in part, and remanded on the breach of contract issue.'0°
CHILD CUSTODY
HEINEN v. HEINEN
In Heinen v. Heinen,'0 ' the North Dakota Supreme Court
held the need to establish a significant change of circumstances in
a custody modification was waived by a stipulation specifying an
alternative procedure.10 2
Ilene and Leo Heinen were divorced in 1986, pursuant to a
stipulation.10 3 The stipulation provided, among other things, that
their two children would live with Leo during the school term and
with Ilene during the summer. °4 This arrangement, according to
the stipulation, was to continue until 1989, when the parties would
review the arrangement and agree as to where the children
should be placed for the majority of the time.10 5 The stipulation
specifically provided that if the parties could not agree, either
could petition the court for a determination based on the chil-
dren's best interests."° In April of 1989, Leo petitioned the trial
court for a custody determination. 0 7 The trial court entered judg-
ment favoring Leo for custody of the children during the school
year. 08 Ilene appealed. 1 0o
Ilene contended that no significant change of circumstances
existed to justify the trial court's custody determination."10 Leo,
on the other hand, contended that a finding of a significant change
of circumstances was not required, because the stipulation called
for only a determination based on the children's best interests."'
Reiterating the necessity of finding a significant change of circum-
stances prior to a custody modification, the North Dakota Supreme
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. 452 N.W.2d 331 (N.D. 1990).
102. Heinen v. Heinen, 452 N.W.2d 331 (N.D. 1990).
103. Heinen, 452 N.W.2d at 332.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 333.
106. Id.
107. Heinen, 452 N.W.2d at 333.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Heinen, 452 N.W.2d at 333.
300 [Vol. 67:2.91
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Court nevertheless recognized the uniqueness of the language
provided in Ilene and Leo's stipulation.112 Because the stipulation
specifically stated the procedure to be used in determining the
custody arrangement, the Court concluded that it operated as a
waiver of the need to establish a significant change of circum-
stances.' 1 3 Reviewing the findings of the trial court, the North
Dakota Supreme Court agreed that the best interest factors
favored placing the children with Leo during the school term.1 14
The judgment of the trial court was affirmed.' 5
CIVIL PROCEDURE
HARMON V. MERCY HOSPITAL
The issue in Harmon v. Mercy Hospital"6 was whether the
district court erred in granting a request for production of docu-
ments under Rule 27 of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure
prior to commencement of a court action." 7 This case centers
around an employment dispute between Mercy Hospital in Willis-
ton and a nurse, Betty Harmon."" Harmon was put on probation
at the hospital because of a dispute with her supervisors.' ° Har-
mon wanted to review her personnel file with her attorney, but
hospital policy would not allow the review.120 Harmon then made
a request for production of her personnel file pursuant to Rule 27
112. Id. at 334-335. See Sjol v. Sjol, 76 N.D. 336, 35 N.W.2d 797 (1949) (the court has
recognized the change of circumstances concept since 1949).
113. Heinen, 452 N.W.2d at 335.
114. Id. at 335-337.
115. Id. at 337.
116. 460 N.W.2d 404 (N.D. 1990).
117. Harmon v. Mercy Hosp., 460 N.W.2d 404, 405-06 (N.D. 1990). Rule 27 provides
in pertinent part:
(a) Before Action.
(1) Petition. A person who desires to perpetuate testimony regarding any
matter may fie a verified petition in the district court of the county of the
residence of any expected adverse party. The petition must be entitled in the
name of the petitioner and show: (i) that the petitioner expects to be a party to
an action but is presently unable to bring it or cause it to be brought, (ii) the
subject matter of the expected action and the petitioner's interest therein, (iii)
the facts the petitioner desires to establish by the proposed testimony and the
reasons for desiring to perpetuate it, (iv) the names or a description of the
persons the petitioner expects will be adverse parties and their addresses so far
as known, and (v) the names and addresses of the persons to be examined and
the substance of the testimony which the petitioner expects to elicit from each,
and shall ask for an order authorizing the petitioner to take the depositions of the
persons to be examined named in the petition, for the purpose of perpetuating
their testimony.
N.D. R. Civ. P. 27(aX1).
118. Harmon, 460 N.W.2d at 405.
119. Id.
120. Id. The hospital would only let her look at the file alone. Id.
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of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure.' 12  The district
court granted Harmon's request.'2
The supreme court concluded that Rule 27 does not allow one
to obtain production of documents for the sole purpose of acquir-
ing facts for a complaint.'3 The court stated that Rule 27 is for
obtaining important evidence that' is in danger of being lost or
concealed prior to commencement of an action."l The court
found that Harmon did not show that the personnel file was in
danger of being lost or altered, or that she could not file an ade-
quate complaint without it.' 25  Therefore, the supreme court
reversed the district court, order granting Harmon's Rule 27
request for production. 2 6
COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES
HOM V. STATE
In Horn v. State,1 7 the issue was whether Dickinson State Uni-
versity (DSU) acted within substantial compliance of provisions of
an employment contract with Mildred Hom, a member of the
DSU faculty." In June, 1985, Hom received a twelve-month
notice of termination of her employment contract with DSU.' 29
The policy manual of the State Board of Higher Education, which
was part of Hom's contract with DSU, established an expedited
review process in cases where a faculty member's contract is not
renewed.' 30 Hom immediately requested written reasons for her
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 406.
124. Harmon, 460 N.W.2d at 406 (citing Ash v. Cort, 512 F.2d 909, 911 (3rd Cir. 1975)).
North Dakota had no case law interpreting Rule 27, so the court looked to cases
interpreting Rule 27 of the federal rules. Id.
125. Id. at 407-08.
126. Id. at 408. In dissent, Justice Meschke presented the view that the test for Rule 27
should be whether pre-complaint discovery is required for the sake of justice. Id. at 411(Meschke, J., dissenting). He pointed out that cases relied upon by the majority were
inconsistent with the history and spirit of the Federal Rules of pre-trial discovery. Id.
Further, Justice Meschke argued that this holding was inconsistent with the recent
strengthening of Rule 11 sanctions requiring a reasonable investigation of the facts and law
prior to filing pleadings. Id. at 410-11. See N.D. R. Civ. P. 11 (signature of attorney on a
pleading certifies that the attorney filed it in good faith). In the interest of expeditingjustice, Meschke believed that Rule 27 should be construed broadly as a discovery device.
Harmon, 460 N.W.2d at 410 (citing Sandmann v. Petron, 404 N.W. 2d 800 (Minn. 1987)
(Yetka, J., dissenting)).
127. 459 N.W.2d 823 (N.D. 1990).
128. Horn v. State, 459 N.W.2d 823, 824 (N.D. 1990).
129. Id.
130. Id. Horn had seven days to request reasons for her termination. Id. DSU had
seven days to reply. Id. Home then had 15 days to request a reconsideration to which DSU
had 15 days to respond. Id. Horn had 60 days from receipt of her termination notice to
request a hearing by the special review committee. Id.
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termination, to which DSU did not respond for seven months.13
The district court found that DSU had acted within substantial
compliance of its employment contract with Horn and dismissed
her breach of contract action. 132
The supreme court ruled that the long delay by DSU in recon-
ciling Horn's termination prejudiced her.133 The court noted that
according to the substantial compliance doctrine, a college does
not have to follow the termination regulations to the letter.' 34 The
court found that the reason for the regulations was to quickly con-
clude termination disputes and give the employee enough time to
find other employment.' 35 According to the court, DSU's seven-
month delay constituted more than just a "trifling departure" from
the terms of the contract, and it impaired her ability to make a
timely decision on future employment.' 36 Therefore, the supreme
court reversed the district court's dismissal and remanded for
determination of Horn's damages.' 37
CONTINUANCE
STATE V. KUNKEL
In State v. Kunkel,13 1 the issue was whether a defendant
should be allowed a continuance when an impoitant witness com-
pletely changes his testimony at the time of the trial.' 39 Werner
Kunkel was arrested for driving while his license was sus-
pended.' 40 At the time of the arrest, his car was parked and he
was standing at the side of the car with another person.' 4 1 The
arresting officers had not seen the men get out of the car, but they
thought they had seen Werner driving earlier.' 42 Initially the
other person, Jeff Myhro, claimed that he was the driver of the
car.' 43 On the date of trial, Kerner's attorney learned for the first
time that Myhro had completely reversed his earlier testimony
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 825.
134. Horn, 459 N.W.2d at 824. In Stensrud v. Mayville State College, 368 N.W.2d 519(N.D. 1985), in which a college president gave oral rather than written reasons for
termination of a faculty member, the court first adopted the substantial compliance
doctrine. Horn, 459 N.W.2d at 824.
135. Id. at 825.
136. Id. at 825-26.
137. Id. at 827.
138. 452 N.W.2d 337 (N.D. 1990).
139. State v. Kunkel, 452 N.W.2d 337 (N.D. 1990).
140. Id. at 338.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. ld.
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and was going to deny driving. 144 Because of surprise and not
being prepared for this development, Kerner's attorney requested
a continuance from the trial judge. 145 The trial judge refused the
continuance, and Werner appealed. 146
When a defendant's "key" witness totally reverses his testi-
mony during trial, he should be allowed a certain period to inquire
into this change and to prepare to impeach the witness.'4 7 The
supreme court distinguished this situation from the situation
where a witness insignificantly changes his testimony.14 1 The
change in this case was not insignificant, as Myhro's testimony
went from "exculpating" Kunkel to "incriminating" him. a1 4  This
was made even more tenuous by the fact that the state decided to
call Myhro as a witness.' 50 The supreme court also found that
there was no evidence to indicate that Kunkel had asked for other
continuances or was ill prepared. 15 ' The supreme court held that
the trial court had abused its discretion by not allowing Kunkel a
continuance.- 2 The case was reversed and remanded.
153
CONTRACTS
HEUPEL, INC. V. SCHUCH
In Heupel, Inc. v. Schuch,5 a the issue was whether an earnest-
money agreement was ambiguous so as to allow extrinsic evidence
to determine the intent of the parties. 5 5 In January of 1985,
Rueben Heupel executed an agreement to purchase property
from Schuch for $25,000.156 Schuch, who was a realtor, prepared
the agreement and required $3,000 in earnest money.15 7 One of
the conditions of the sale was that the property would be zoned
agricultural (allowing 1 to 2 horses and pets), but no feedlot or nui-
144. Kunkel, 452 N.W.2d at 338.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 338-39. Subsequently the state called Myhro as a witness, and Werner was
convicted. Id.
147. See Arrant v. Wainwright, 468 F.2d 677 (5th Cir. 1972) ("where key witness
changed her testimony from incriminating defendant to exculpating him, state was entitled
to a reasonable delay in trial so that it could investigate the change in testimony and
prepare a case for impeachment").
148. Kunkel, 452 N.W.2d at 339.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 340.
151. Id. Also, there was no evidence that the continuance would burden the court. Id.
152. Kunkel, 452 N.W.2d at 340.
153. Id.
154. 453 N.W.2d 776 (N.D. 1990).
155. Heupel, Inc. v. Schuch, 453 N.W.2d 776, 777 (N.D. 1990).
156. Id.
157. Id.
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sance would be allowed.' 5 8 Heupel intended to use the property
for 4-H animals, and Schuch reassured him that it would be
okay. 5 9 However, after a request by Heupel to the Mandan City
Council, it was determined that because of a Mandan City ordi-
nance, only a maximum of three horses would be allowed.' 60 This
was unacceptable to Heupel, and he requested return of his ear-
nest money.161 After Schuch's refusal, Heupel initiated an action
for recission of the agreement.16 2 The trial court found that the
contract was ambiguous and allowed extrinsic evidence to deter-
mine the intent of the parties.' 63 The trial court found for Heupel
and Schuch appealed."6
A contract is ambiguous when rational arguments support dif-
ferent meanings. 16 5 The ambiguities in this contract referred to
the term "pet" and whether "no feedlot or nuisance" referred to
the Mandan ordinance."6 The supreme court first looked at the
relevant contract statutes to be applied in this case. 167 They then
determined what the popular definition of pet would be.'6 They
concluded that pet had a broader meaning than simply dogs and
cats, as Schuch had argued.' 69 The court also determined that the
Mandan ordinance created an inconsistency in the agreement. 1
70
Because of these inconsistencies, the court allowed extrinsic evi-
dence.17  The court then determined that it was not clearly erro-
neous for the trial court to have resolved this conflict in favor of
Heupel and against the maker of the agreement.' 72 The supreme
court affirmed the trial court's decision.'
73
158. Heupel, 453 N.W.2d at 777.
159. Id.
160. Id. The ordinance provides that it is a nuisance to keep chickens, swine, rabbits,
or cows in the city limits. MANDAN, N.D., CITY ORDINANCE § 13-01-05.
161. Heupel, 453 N.W.2d at 777.
162. Id.
163. Id. When a contract is ambiguous, North Dakota law requires that the contract be
interpreted more strongly against the person who caused the ambiguity. Id. See N.D.
CENT. CODE § 9-07-19 (1987) (there is a presumption that the cause of an uncertainty in a
contract was caused by the party that made it).
164. Heupel, 453 N.W.2d at 777.
165. Id. (citing National Bank of Harvey v. International Harvestor Co., 421 N.W.2d
799, 801 (N.D. 1988)).
166. Id.
167. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-07-06 (1987) (contract construed as a whole giving
effect to all provisions); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 9-07-02, 04 (1987) (intent ascertained from
only the writing if possible); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-07-09 (1987) (ordinary meaning usually
given terms in a contract).
168. Heupel, 453 N.W.2d at 778. The court used the Webster Dictionary meaning for
the word pet. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. City law prohibits horses, while the contract allowed 1 or 2 horses. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
173. Heupel, 453 N.W.2d at 778.
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COUNTIES
MILES HOMES V. CITY OF WESTHOPE
In Miles Homes v. City of Westhope, 7 4 the first issue was
whether a county auditor has a duty to search receipts supplied by
the county treasurer for a possible new address for mailing of
notice of expiration of redemption to a delinquent taxpayer. 175
The second issue was whether the city and county were immune
because this action was a discretionary function. 176
In February of 1980, Barry and Tamara Deschamp gave
Insilico a mortgage to secure a $46,000 debt on a lot in Wes-
thope. 177 This mortgage was recorded, and Insilico listed his
address as "4500 Lyndale Ave. North, Minneapolis, MN .... ,,7
The taxes for 1980-82 were not paid on the property. 79 The
period of redemption (5 years) ran for each year, and at the end of
each redemption period, the Bottineau County Auditor sent a
notice that the period of redemption had run.18° In each of the
three years, the notice was sent to Insilico's old address.' 8' In
1985, when the first notice was sent, Insilico paid the delinquent
taxes and his new address appeared on the check used to pay the
taxes.18 2 Each year the county treasurer mailed a receipt to
Insilico at his new address, but failed to list the new address on the
receipt or supply a receipt to the auditor.' 3 Insilico did not
receive the notice in 1987, when the redemption period had run
for the 1982 taxes, because the post office's "move order" had
expired.1 4 The county obtained title. to the property through a
tax deed.'8 5 In February 1989, Insilico brought an action against
the county, alleging negligence on the part of the county auditor
in not discovering his new address.' 86 Summary judgment was
granted by the trial court to the county.18 7
Section 57-28-04 of the North Dakota Century Code requires
that notice of expiration of period of redemption be sent by the
174. 458 N.W.2d 321 (N.D.1990).
175. Miles Homes v. City of Westhope, 458 N.W.2d 321 (N.D. 1990).
176. Id. at 325-327.
177. Id. at 322.
178. Id.
179. Miles Homes, 458 N.W.2d at 322.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Miles Homes, 458 N.W.2d at 322.
185. ld.
186. ld.
187. Id. at 323.
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auditor to the address furnished by the register of deeds. ' The
trial court determined that the auditor had satisfied that duty and
was not negligent.) s9 However, Insilico claimed that under North
Dakota Century Code section 57-20-08, the county treasurer was
required to supply the auditor with a receipt that listed his new
address, and the auditor had a duty to search those receipts for a
new address."' The supreme court held that, in light of Mullane
v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., the auditor had a duty to
search the tax payment receipts furnished by the county
treasurer.' 9 1
The supreme court then had to determine if the acts of these
public officials constituted a discretionary function, thus immune
under North Dakota Century Code section 32-12.1-03.192 The
court determined that the requirements of North Dakota Century
Code section 57-20-08 were mandatory and nbt discretionary.91 3
In this case the county treasurer had not supplied these receipts to
the auditor.' 94 The court reversed the summary judgment and
remanded for trial.' 95
COURTS
IN RE ESTATE OF RIDL
In In re Estate of Ridl, 96 the North Dakota Supreme Court
held that a county court, under its implied powers as a probate
court, had jurisdiction to decide matters of malfeasance, malprac-
tice, and breach of fiduciary duty on the part of a personal
representative.19 7
Robert Baird, an attorney, was appointed personal representa-
tive of William Ridl's estate after Ridl's death in 1983.198 In Feb-
ruary of 1988, Kenneth Ridl, an "interested person" of the Ridl
188. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-28-04 (1983).
189. Miles Homes, 458 N.W.2d at 323. The trial court stated that nothing in section 57-
28-04 requires the auditor to go beyond the mandates of the statute. Id.
190. Id. at 324.
191. Miles Homes, 458 N.W.2d at 324; Mullane v. Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 339
U.S. 306 (1950). When an action will affect an interest in property, "a state must provide
'notice reasonably calculated, under all circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objection."'
Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314 (citation omitted).
192. Miles Homes, 458 N.W.2d at 325. See N.D. CENT CODE § 32-12.1-03(3Xc) (a
discretionary act by a public employee is an exception to liability of a political subdivision).
193. Miles Homes, 458 N.W.2d at 326.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. 455 N.W.2d 188 (N.D. 1990).
197. In re Estate of Ridl, 455 N.W.2d 188 (N.D. 1990).
198. Id. at 189.
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estate, sought an order directing Baird to file a final accounting.199
Baird filed his final accounting and petition for settlement and
confirmation in March of 1988.2 0 Kenneth Ridl objected to the
final accounting, alleging that Baird improperly ified and prepared
tax returns for the estate, paid himself unreasonable fees, and
caused overdrafts against estate accounts. 20 1 The county court
found that Baird breached his fiduciary duty by mismanaging the
estate and consequently removed him as personal representative
and attorney, reduced his attorney fees, and ordered him to pay
present and future losses to the estate. °2 Baird appealed, con-
tending that the county court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to
decide the issue of breach of fiduciary duty. °3
Looking to Title 30.1 of the North Dakota Century Code, the
North Dakota Supreme Court examined the grant of exclusive
probate jurisdiction to county courts, and its relationship to the
powers, duties and liabilities of the personal representative.20 4
The court held that, in addition to the county court's authority to
review the personal representative's actions and compensation,
the statutory scheme also gives the county court jurisdiction to
hold the personal representative liable for losses to the estate
caused by a breach of fiduciary duty.20 5 Allowing the county court
to decide such issues facilitates the probate code's stated purpose
promoting speedy and efficient distribution of the estate.2°
The North Dakota Supreme Court also reviewed the trial
court's order requiring Baird to pay $9,605.85 in present losses
and $36,594.00 in future losses to the estate.20 7 The court con-
cluded that although the county court correctly charged Baird for
present losses attributable to lost interest, overdrafts, and faulty
tax returns, the charge for $36,594.00 in future losses was in
error.20 8 A claim against the personal representative for losses to
the estate cannot accrue until actual losses have been incurred.20 9
The judgment was affirmed in part, reversed in part and
199. Id. at 189-190. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-01-06(21) (defining "interested
persons" as heirs, devisees, children, spouses, creditors, beneficiaries, and other persons
having a property right in or claim against the decedent's estate).
200. Estate ofRidl, 455 N.W.2d at 190.
201. Id.
202. Estate of Ridl, 455 N.W.2d at 190.
203. Id. at 190.
204. Id. at 190-192.
205. Id. at 192-193.
206. Estate of Ridl, 455 N.W.2d at 192-193.
207. Id. at 193-195.
208. Id. at 194-195. The court also upheld the county court's reduction of Baird's
attorney fees from $35,404.46 to $4,000. Id. at 193-194.
209. Estate ofRidl, 455 N.W.2d at 195.
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remanded. 1 0
ODDEN V. O'KEEFE
In Odden v. O'Keefe, 11 the North Dakota Supreme Court
held that a blanket moratorium on civil jury trials for budgetary
purposes violated a plaintiff's constitutional right to a jury trial.212
Bernard Odden's personal injury and wrongful death action
was scheduled for a jury trial in the Northeast Judicial District on
January 29, 1990.21" In December of 1989, Odden was informed
that, due to budget cuts, a moratorium on all civil jury trials had
been ordered. 14 Odden then petitioned the North Dakota
Supreme Court for a supervisory writ requiring the judge to
schedule his civil action for a jury trial.215
The issue facing the North Dakota Supreme Court was
whether the moratorium on all civil jury trials for a period of
eighteen months was constitutional under the state constitution. 18
Noting the similarity between state and federal constitutional pro-
visions guaranteeing the right to a jury trial in civil cases, the court
looked to a recent Ninth Circuit case on point for guidance.2 1 7
Following the rationale that the availability of constitutional rights
should not be subject to budgetary shortfalls or political judg-
ments, the court concluded that the blanket moratorium was a vio-
lation of Odden's state constitutional right to a civil jury trial.2 "'
Believing the district court would grant the appropriate rem-
edy to Odden in light of its decision, the North Dakota Supreme
Court denied Odden's petition for a supervisory writ.2 19
CRIMINAL LAW
STATE v. FASCHING
In State v. Fasching, 0 the issue was whether testimonial and
nontestimonial evidence should be suppressed when a Miranda
210. Id. at 195.
211. 450 N.W.2d 707 (N.D. 1990).
212. Odden v. O'Keefe, 450 N.W.2d 707 (N.D. 1990).
213. Id. at 707.
214. Id.
215. Id. The court's authority to issue a supervisory writ comes from article 6 section 2
of the North Dakota Constitution. Id. at 708.
216. Odden, 450 N.W.2d at 708.
217. Id. at 708-709. See Amster v. United States District Court, 792 F.2d 1423 (9th Cir.
1986) (a blanket moratorium violates the seventh amendment to the United States
Constitution).
218. Id. at 710.
219. Id.
220. 453 N.W.2d 761 (N.D. 1990).
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warning is not given in a custodial interrogation.2 1 On January 1,
1989, Julie Fasching's car was stopped by a Morton County deputy
sheriff.2 2 The officer suspected Fasching of driving under the
influence of alcohol.22 3 At the time of the stop, Fasching was
accompanied by her attorney, Debra Holter.2 4 After Fasching
was seated in the patrol car, Holter asked that she be allowed to
advise her client.2 m The officer refused the request and preceded
to interrogate and test Fasching for alcohol consumption.z 6 Sub-
sequently Fasching was arrested and then given her Miranda
warnings. 27 Fasching claimed that because of this custodial inter-
rogation, she should have been given her Miranda warnings at the
time the interrogation began.Y She claimed that because of this
failure, all evidence gained after she was placed in the patrol car
should be suppressed.2 9 The trial court agreed and the state
appealed. 3 °
The North Dakota Supreme Court reiterated the basis for the
Miranda warning by citing a passage from Miranda.23 ' A custodial
interrogation without the Miranda warning requires that all
responses be suppressed as evidence.232  However, this fifth
amendment protection does not apply to nontestimonial testing
such as blood tests, fingerprints, etc.233 Even though the state did
not claim that this was a noncustodial interrogation, the supreme
court showed the difference between custodial interrogation and
questioning as a part of a "general on-the-scene" investigation. 3 4
A routine traffic stop and "general on-the-scene" investigation
does not require the Miranda warnings.2 35 The trial court found
that a person has the right to an attorney at a "sustained and intim-
idating" questioning, and the supreme court did not disturb the
221. State v. Fasching, 452 N.W.2d 761, 761 (N.D. 1990). -
222. Id.
223. Id. at 761-62.
224. Id. at 762.
225. Fasching, 453 N.W.2d at 762.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. Fasching also claimed that the officer did not have probable cause for the stop.
Id. Because of this illegal arrest all the evidence should have been suppressed. Id.
Fasching also claimed that she was denied her right to counsel. Id.
229. Id.
230. Fasching, 453 N.W.2d at 762.
231. Id. at 762-63.
232. Fasching, 453 N.W.2d at 763.
233. Id. (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764-65 (1966)) (fifth amendment
does not protect an accused from "'compulsion as to the source of 'real or physical
evidence ... ").
234. Fasching, 453 N.W.2d at 763, 764.
235. Id. at 763 (relying on Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984)).
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decision that the trial court made as to this issue." 6 However, the
supreme court did find that not all aspects of this stop were testi-
monial.237 The answers that Fasching gave to questioning were
correctly suppressed, but the evidence derived from field testing
should not have been suppressed. 38
Fasching also argued that this arrest was made without prob-
able cause .39 However, the trial court failed to indicate whether
the officer had reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop
her. 4 ° Since the trial court was silent on this issue, the supreme
court could not make a determination. However, this avenue was
still available to her on remand.2 4 ' The court reversed and
remanded for further determinations. 42
STATE v. HOGIE
In State v. Hogie,1 3 the issue was whether possession of a sto-
len car by a defendant charged with theft provided the sufficient
corroboration to the testimony of his accomplices for a convic-
tion.244 In April of 1987, Robert Hogie and two friends stole a car
and drove it to Kansas, where they were apprehended.2 5 Hogie
stole the keys used to take the car, and he signed a consent-to-
search form when they were stopped in Kansas. 46 Hogie was
charged with theft of an automobile.2 47 The state used Hogie's
two accomplices as witnesses in his trial, and called the sheriff
from Kansas to corroborate their testimony.248 The jury found
Hogie guilty of theft of a vehicle. 49
The supreme court held that the corroborating testimony in
this case was sufficient to support Hogie's conviction of theft.250
The court noted that North Dakota does not allow a conviction of a
crime by the uncorroborated testimony of the defendant's accom-
236. Fasching, 453 N.W.2d at 764.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 764, 765.
240. Fasching, 453 N.W.2d at 765.
241. id.
242. id.
243. 454 N.W.2d 501 (N.D. 1990).
244. State v. Hogie, 454 N.W.2d 501, 502 (N.D. 1990).
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Hogie, 454 N.W.2d at 502-03:
249. Id. at 503. The state then moved for a revocation of Hogie's probation on a
previous burglary conviction. Id. At least partly based on his theft of a vehicle conviction,
Hogie's probation was revoked, and the trial court gave Hogie a concurrent sentence. Id.
Hogie appealed the theft of a vehicle conviction and the probation revocation. Id.
250. Id. at 505.
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plices.25' The court concluded that the state need not corroborate
every fact testified to by an accomplice. 2 The corroborating tes-
timony must only connect the defendant with the crime's commis-
sion.2 3 The corroboration does not, in itself, need to be enough
evidence for a conviction,'1 The court stated than an inference of
guilt was established when Hogie was found in possession of a
recently stolen car.25 The court reasoned that this possession cor-
roborated the testimony of Hogie's accomplices.' Thus, the
court upheld the jury's conviction of Hogie for theft of a
vehicle. 5
STATE V. PICKAR
In State v. Pickar s the issue was whether a confession given
to law officers was involuntary, thus requiring suppression of the
statement.2 9 Pickar was involved in an automobile accident in
which two women were killed.26 0 After the accident, Pickar
denied that he was the driver of the vehicle.2 1 The placement of
his injuries suggested to investigators that he may have been the
driver. 2 Subsequently Pickar consented to questioning. The
questioning lasted about an hour and forty-five minutes, and dur-
ing the last fifteen he admitted to driving the car.2 4 Pickar was
arrested and charged with two counts of manslaughter. 6 5 He
moved the district court for suppression of the confession because
it was involuntary.266 The district court granted the motion and
the state appealed.2 67
In determining whether a confession is voluntary, a court
251. Id. at 503. See N.D. CENT CODE § 29-21-14 (1974) (accomplice testimony must be
corroborated).
252. Hogie, 454 N.W.2d at 503.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 504.
256. Hogie, 454 N.W.2d at 505.
257. Id. The court also upheld Hogie's probation revocation. Id. In dissent, Justice
VandeWalle argued that the majority put too much weight on Hogie's possession of the
automobile. Id. at 506 (VandeWalle J., dissenting). VandeWalle reasoned that the evidence
presented against Hogie was too remote and involved too much speculation as to his guilt.
Id. at 507. VandeWalle warned that the corroboration requirement protects defendants
from convictions based on "coincidence and speculation". Id.
258. 453 N.W.2d 783 (N.D. 1990).
259. State v. Pickar, 453 N.W.2d 783, 784 (N.D. 1990).
260. Id. at 784.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 784-85.
263. Pickar, 453 N.W.2d at 785.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 784, 785.
266. Id. at 785.
267. Id.
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must determine if it is a decision that the defendant made freely
without coercion.' This is done by considering the "totality of
the circumstances surrounding the confession. ' '2 69 A court must
consider the characteristics and the condition of the accused, and
also the surroundings in which the confession was given.270 The
supreme court first looked at the character of the accused in the
context of this case. 271 The trial court determined that Pickar was
in such an emotional state that his statement was involuntarily
given.2 7 2 The supreme court also looked at the police conduct in
this case. 3 In this case, considering the length and the surround-
ings of his interrogation, the trial court found that Pickar was sus-
ceptible to police coercion because of his emotional state.2 7 4 Also,
the trial court determined that the police used psychological pres-
sure to induce this confession.2 7 5 The supreme court reviewed all
the evidence of the case and determined that it was sufficient to
support the trial court's finding of involuntariness. 76 Since volun-
tariness was a question of fact to which the trial court must be
given great deference, they affirmed the trial court's judgment. 7
DIVORCE
HEGGEN V. HEGGEN
In Heggen v. Heggeny Patricia Heggen appealed from a trial
court's division of property and award of child support in her
divorce action.279 After 22 years of marriage, Patricia and John
Heggen were divorced, with custody of the two youngest children
awarded to Patricia.2 0 In the divorce judgment, John was
268. Pickar, 453 N.W.2d at 785.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 785-86. The factors considered include sex and race of suspect, education,
physical and mental condition, prior experience with the police. Id. at 785. See 1 W.
LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 6.2, 448-49 (1984).
272. Pickar, 453 N.W.2d at 785. To support this finding the trial court relied on an
affidavit that stated Pickar was so emotional that he might commit suicide. Id. The state
contended that this was Pickar's emotional state of mind after the interrogation and not at
the time of confession. Id.
273. Id. at 786-87.
274. Id. at 786.
275. Id. Coercive police conduct is determined by the length and conditions of the
custody, the police attitude towards defendant, and the pressures exerted. Id. (citing
Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564 (1987). There was evidence that Pickar was urged to
confess in order to relieve his conscience and the anguish to the families of the women
killed in the accident. Id. at 787.
276. Pickar, 453 N.W.2d at 787.
277. Id.
278. 452 N.W.2d 96 (N.D. 1990).
279. Heggen v. Heggen, 452 N.W.2d 96, 98 (N.D. 1990).
280. Heggen, 452 N.W.2d at 98.
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ordered to pay $240 per month for each child.2 1 The marital
estate was divided, leaving John with 55 percent of the net estate
and Patricia with 45 percent. 2 Patricia appealed both the prop-
erty division and child support award. 8 3 John cross-appealed,
challenging the custody determination."
Patricia contended that the trial court erred in its valuation of
certain business property. 285 The trial court ascribed a $40,000
value to the Heggen Equipment real estate and buildings, based
on the testimony of John's banker that the real estate and build-
ings were only worth their liquidation value.' The North Dakota
Supreme Court found that unless there is evidence of distressed
interest factors in their determination conditions, fair market
value is the proper method of valuing property in a divorce. 287
Because no evidence was offered to show distressed conditions, the
court held that the trial court's determination was clearly
erroneous.2
8
Additionally, Patricia challenged the trial court's valuation of
the Heggen Equipment Corporation." 9 She contended that the
trial court valued the corporation on a net basis, and then pro-
ceeded to offset corporate debt, resulting in the double deduction
of debt.' 9 The court held that the deduction of corporate debts
from the net value of the corporation was clear error because lia-
bilities had already been deducted.291
John, in his cross-appeal, challenged the trial court's award of
custody of the two youngest children to Patricia, contending that
the court erroneously awarded custody solely because Patricia was
the primary caretaker. 92 Reviewing the trial court's findings, the
North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that the trial court cor-
rectly weighed the best interest factors in their determination.293
Although the primary caretaker is not presumptively granted
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 97.
284. Heggen, 452 N.W.2d at 98.
285. Id. at 99.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Heggen, 452 N.W.2d at 99.
289. Id. at 100.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Heggen, 452 N.W.2d at 101. Patricia also challenged, as too low, the amount of
child support John was ordered to pay. Id. The court found that although the award was
far from generous, it was not clearly erroneous. Id.
293. Id. at 101-102. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.2 (Supp. 1989) (the court is to
consider certain factors when deciding what is in the best interest of the child in child
custody disputes).
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favored status, the court may take that factor into consideration,
along with the statutory best interest factors when determining
child custody.9 4
The custody and child support awards were affirmed, and the
property division was reversed and remanded. 93
THORLAKSEN V. THORLAKSEN
In .Thorlaksen v. Thorlaksen,2 96 Gregory Thorlaksen appealed
a district court decree that awarded Robin Thorlaksen custody of
three of the parties' children, ordered him to pay $600 per month
child support, and found him in contempt of court for child sup-
port arrearages. 9 7 The parties were divorced in August of 1987,
but because Robin Thorlaksen was not represented by counsel in
the settlement, she sought relief from the decree a month later.29 8
After prolonged proceedings, the district court determined the
issues of child custody, support and visitation two years later, rul-
ing that Robin would have primary possession of the children dur-
ing the school year and Greg during the summer. 9 Additionally,
the court ordered Greg to pay $600 per month in child support.3°
Greg subsequently fell behind in his payments and moved the
court to reconsider the child support amounts.3 0 ' The trial court,
in turn, modified Greg's child support obligation so he would not
be obligated to pay during the months when the children lived
with him, but proceeded to find him in contempt of court for child
support arrearages. 302  Greg appealed, challenging the court's
determination of custody, child support and contempt.z 3
The North Dakota Supreme Court addressed Greg's argu-
ment that the district court used improper gender bias in placing
the children with their mother.30 4 Reviewing the findings of the
district court, the court concluded that comments made by the dis-
trict court regarding the younger children's need to be with their
294. Heggen, 452 N.W.2d at 101-102.
295. Id. at 102.
296. 453 N.W.2d 770 (N.D. 1990).
297. Thorlaksen v. Thorlaksen, 453 N.W.2d 770 (N.D. 1990).
298. Thorlaksen, 453 N.W.2d at 771.
299. Id. at 772.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Thorlaksen, 453 N.W.2d at 772.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 774. In challenging the custody determination, Greg also raised issues of
Robin's marriage during the custody proceedings and the use by the court of an addendum
to a home studies report that was not entered into evidence. Id. at 772-773. The court
rejected Greg's efforts to disparage Robin and found use of the addendum to be harmless
error. Id. at 772-774.
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mother were not improper.3 °5 While an assumption by a trial
court that a mother should always be selected over a father to have
custody of small children would be improper, the North Dakota
Supreme Court found that the district court had fairly weighed
the fitness of both parents before making their custody
determination.3 ° s
As to child support, the North Dakota Supreme Court held
that an award of child support below the guidelines cannot be
determined to be too high without some showing that the obligor
cannot pay or that the obligee does not need it all.307 The court
found no such showing and concluded that the award of $600 was
not clearly erroneous.3 0 8
Finally, the court considered Greg's contention that the dis-
trict court's contempt ruling was made without fair procedure,
notice or hearing. a° While the trial court may punish contempt
occurring in view of the court without notice and hearing, when
the contempt finding is for nonperformance of a judicial decree
outside of the courtroom, notice and hearing are required before
punishment can be imposed.3 10 The court concluded that the dis-
trict court's contempt finding was for the nonpayment of child
support, not for behavior that occurred within the view of the
court, and held that the district court did not properly adhere to
rules of procedure in the contempt finding. 311 Nevertheless, the
child support payments past due could not be retroactively
reduced.3 12
The finding of contempt was reversed, and the custody and
support determinations were affirmed.313
RAMSDELL V. RAMSDELL
In Ramsdell v. Ramsdell,z14 Shirley Ramsdell appealed a trial
court order terminating her alimony upon remarriage.3 15 Shirley
and Gene Ramsdell were divorced in 1985 after 14 years of mar-
riage. 16 Pursuant to a stipulation entered into by the parties,
305. Thorlaksen, 453 N.W.2d at 774.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 774-775.
308. Id.
309. Thorlaksen, 453 N.W.2d at 775.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Thorlaksen, 453 N.W.2d at 776.
314. 454 N.W.2d 522 (N.D. 1990).
315. Ramsdell v. Ramsdell, 454 N.W.2d 522, 523 (N.D. 1990).
316. Ramsdell, 454 N.W.2d at 523.
316 [Vol. 67:291
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
Gene Ramsdell paid $300 per month to Shirley.317 The stipulation
did not signify whether the payments were intended as property
or support.3 18 In 1988, Shirley sued Gene for delinquent alimony
and for failing to deliver certain property pursuant to the
decree.319 Gene contended that his alimony payments to Shirley
should be terminated because of her remarriage. 20 Shirley
argued that the alimony was intended to be a permanent property
settlement, not spousal support.32 ' The trial court, viewing the ali-
mony payments as spousal support, terminated Gene's $300 obli-
gation to Shirley because of her remarriage.32 2  Shirley
appealed.32
Reviewing the findings of the trial court, the North Dakota
Supreme Court concluded that sufficient evidence supported the
* determination that Shirley's alimony be considered support rather
than property.324 Although the word "alimony" is ambiguous, the
fact that the alimony clause in the stipulation was separate from
the property division clause, and that Shirley received a large por-
tion of marital assets compared to Gene's assumption of marital
debts, substantiated the determination that her alimony was
intended as support and not property.3z
Shirley Ramsdell alternatively argued that her remarriage did
not require termination of her support.32 6 She contended that her
permanent disability from polio and economic conditions of her
new marriage justified continuation.32 7 The North Dakota
Supreme Court reiterated its position that remarriage will ordina-
rily call for a termination of support unless extraordinary circum-
stances exist to justify continuance.32 The court held that
although a disability may, in some cases, constitute an extraordi-
nary circumstance, it will not automatically justify continuance of
support.3 29 Insufficient evidence existed to show that Shirley's dis-
ability and economic conditions of her new marriage constituted
extraordinary circumstances. 330 The court concluded that remar-
317. Id.
318. Id. at 524.
319. Id. at 523.
320. Ramsdell, 454 N.W.2d at 523.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Id. at 523.
324. Ramsdell, 454 N.W.2d at 524.
325. ld.
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Ramsdell, 454 N.W.2d at 524-525.
329. Id. at 525.
330. Id.
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riage was reason enough to terminate her support.3 3 1
The judgment of the trial court was affirmed. 3 2
DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED
KEEPSEAGLE V. BACKES
In Keepseagle v. Backes,333 the issue was whether the words
"performance of a chemical test within two hours after driving...
of a vehicle .... " from section 39-20-03.1 of the North Dakota
Century Code require actual performance of a blood test or
merely collection of the blood sample within the two hour
period.334 In May of 1989, Wayne Keepseagle was stopped for
speeding south of Bismarck.33 5 After performing the field sobriety
tests, he was arrested for driving while under the influence of alco-
hol.336 Fifty-five minutes after Keepseagle was stopped, a blood
sample was taken from him.3  The sample was tested four days
later, and it contained a blood-alcohol concentration of 0.11 per-
cent.338  Keepseagle requested an -administrative hearing to
review the suspension of his drivers license. 39 The administrative
hearing officer determined that Mr. Keepseagle was properly
arrested and tested for blood-alcohol content, and the district
court in Burleigh County affirmed.34 °
The supreme court held that section 39-20-03.1 of the North
Dakota Century Code is satisfied if a blood sample is taken within
two hours of driving a vehicle. 34' The sample does not have to be
tested within the two-hour period.342 The court noted that the
only error complained of by Keepseagle was that his blood test was
331. Id.
332. Ramsdell, 454 N.W.2d at 525.
333. 454 N.W.2d 312 (N.D. 1990).
334. Keepseagle v. Backes, 454 N.W.2d 312,314-15 (N.D. 1990). See N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 39-20-03.1 (Supp. 1989) (drivers license suspended if a chemical test taken within two
hours of a stop shows a blood-alcohol level greater than 0.01 percent).
335. Keepseagle, 454 N.W.2d at 313.
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Keepseagle, 454 N.W.2d at 313.
340. Id. at 314.
341. Id. at 316.
342. Id. Section 39-20-03.1 of the North Dakota Century Code provides in pertinent
part that:
If a person submits to a test ... and the test shows that person to have a
blood alcohol concentration of at least ten one-hundredths of one percent by
weight at the time of the performance of a chemical test within two hours after
the driving or being in actual physical control of a vehicle, the following
procedures apply: ...
N.D. CENT CODE § 39-20-03.1 (Supp. 1989).
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not performed within two hours of his stop.3 43 The court recog-
nized that similar statutes had been challenged, but that no one
had previously questioned this issue.344 Other cases have assumed
only that a blood sample must be taken within the two hour
period.345 The court found this interpretation to be consistent
with common sense.346 Thus, the court affirmed the suspension of
Keepseagle's license to drive.347
EVIDENCE
OBERLANDER V. OBERLANDER
In Oberlander v. Oberlander,348 the issue was whether the
district court erred in not allowing a witness to testify as an expert
in psychology. 349 After a lengthy divorce proceeding centering on
the issue of custody, Jack Oberlander was awarded physical cus-
tody, and Rebecca Oberlander was allowed reasonable visitation of
the couple's three children.35 0 At trial, a guardian ad litem for the
children recommended joint physical custody.35 ' The guardian ad
litem based her opinion on the report of a psychologist who
administered the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory
(MMPI) on Rebecca and Jack.35 1 A psychologist testifying as an
expert witness for Jack opined that Rebecca should not receive
primary custody of the children, and that they should be put in
Jack's control.35 3 Jack's expert also based her testimony on the
MMPI test results.3 1 Rebecca called her own expert witness to
interpret the MMPI test results.355 The district court ruled, how-
ever, that because Rebecca's expert was not a member of the
American Psychological Association and did not have a North
Dakota psychological license, he did not qualify as an expert
witness.3
The supreme court held that Rebecca's witness qualified as an
343. Keepseagle, 454 N.W.2d at 316.
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. Id. at 315.
347. Keepseagle, 454 N.W.2d at 316.
348. 460 N.W.2d 400 (N.D. 1990).
349. Oberlander v. Oberlander, 460 N.W.2d 400, 402 (N.D. 1990).
350. Id. at 401.
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. Oberlander, 460 N.W.2d at 401-02.
354. Id.
355. Id. at 402.
356. Id.
1991] 319
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
expert in psychology and should have been allowed to testify.357
Rule 702 of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence allows expert tes-
timony, if specialized knowledge could aid in the understanding of
the case.358 The court determined that there is no license require-
ment in Rule 702.3 - 9 The court stated that a witness can qualify as
an expert solely through "knowledge, skill, experience, training or
education. '360 Thus, the court reversed the part of the divorce
decree awarding physical custody to Jack and remanded for a
hearing at which time Rebecca's witness will be allowed to testify
as a psychological expert.36 '
FAMILY LAW
SMITH V. SMITH
In Smith v. Smith,362 the issue was whether the district court
properly retained jurisdiction to (1) dissolve a marriage and (2)
adjudicate the incidences of that marriage.3 63 After 31 years of
marriage, Milton Smith, a resident of Larimore, North Dakota, ini-
tiated a divorce action from Joan Smith, a resident of Verona,
Pennsylvania, in the District Court for Grand Forks County.3
Milton lived in various residences throughout and outside the
United States due to the requirements of his job.36 5 Throughout
the time Milton worked away from home, Joan continued to live in
a house purchased by the couple in Pennsylvania.3  She was not a
resident of North Dakota.367 Milton moved to Larimore in 1986
and kept North Dakota residency throughout the pendency of this
357. Oberlander, 460 N.W.2d at 403. Rebecca's witness was licensed in Minnesota as a
psychologist, had a master's degree in child development and family relations and guidance
and counseling, had completed 2,000 hours of marriage and family counseling in order to
receive clinical status with the American Association of Family Therapy and the Association
of Marriage and Family Therapy, and had spent 25 years as a counselor. Id.
358. Id. at 402. See N.D. R. EvlD. 702 (qualified expert may testify as to an opinion to
aid the fact finder).
359. Oberlander, 460 N.W.2d at 402 (citing Collom v. Pierson, 411 N.W.2d 92, 95-96
(N.D. 1987)).
360. Id.
361. Id. at 403. Surrogate Justice Pederson agreed that the expert testimony should
have been allowed, but he also felt the district court's findings of fact were clearly
erroneous. Id. at 404 (Pederson, Surrogate J., concurring specially). He argued that the
court should have retained jurisdiction to review the findings subsequent to the hearing
upon remand. Id.
362. 459 N.W.2d 785 (N.D. 1990).
363. Smith v. Smith, 459 N.W.2d 785 (N.D. 1990).
364. Id. at 786-87. Milton and Joan were married in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania in April
of 1957. Id. at 786. Joan was served in April of 1988 in Pennsylvania. Id. at 787. In
February 1989, Joan filed for divorce in Pennsylvania. Id.
365. Id. Milton was a mechanic for a company engaged in building airplanes. Id.
366. Id.
367. Id.
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case.31 s Joan, in her answer filed in the divorce action, claimed
that the district court did not have personal jurisdiction over
her.369 The district court found it did have jurisdiction over Mrs.
Smith.370 No appearance was made by Joan at the divorce trial.371
The district court entered a decree of divorce dissolving the
Smiths' marriage and distributing their marital property.3 72
The supreme court stated that according to the "divisible
divorce" doctrine, there are different jurisdictional requirements
for dissolving the marriage than for deciding issues of alimony,
spousal support, property distribution, child support and child cus-
tody.373 The supreme court stated that the action to dissolve a
marriage is one in rem. 374 As long as Milton satisfied the residency
requirements, the North Dakota District court properly termi-
nated his marriage, regardless of the location of Joan's resi-
dence. 375 The supreme court upheld the dissolution of the
divorce.
The supreme court set a different standard for adjudicating
the incidences of the marriage by requiring in personam jurisdic-
tion over both parties to the divorce. 378 The test for personal juris-
diction requires either the satisfaction of the "long-arm" provision
contained in the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure over the
nonresident, or an appearance in court by the nonresident without
challenging the court's personal jurisdiction.3 77 The court rea-
soned that personal jurisdiction could not be obtained over Joan by
the district court, because she had insufficient contacts with North
Dakota, and because she only appeared in court to contest its juris-
diction. 8 Therefore, the court affirmed the dissolution of the
marriage and reversed the distribution of the incidences to the
368. Id.
369. Smith, 459 N.W.2d at 787.
370. Id. A hearing was held to determine the jurisdictional issue. Id. Joan appeared
specially for this hearing to contest jurisdiction. Id.
371. Id.
372. Id.
373. Id. at 787, 788-89 (citing Hall v. Hall, 585 S.W.2d 384, 385 (Ky. 1979)).
374. Smith, 459 N.W.2d at 787-88. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 207 (1977) (In
rem jurisdiction is "a customary elliptical way of referring to jurisdiction over the interests
of a person in a thing").
375. Smith, 459 N.W.2d at 788 (citing Byzewski v. Byzewski, 429 N.W.2d 394, 397
(N.D. 1988)).
376. Id. at 788. The court stated that, "a court must have personal jurisdiction over a
non-resident spouse in order to validly adjudicate matters of alimony or spousal support; the
distribution or division of property; rights to child custody; and the award of child support."
Id. at 788-89 (citations omitted).
377. Id. at 789. See N.D.R. CIv. P. 4(bX2) (personal jurisdiction based on contacts with
the state).
378. Smith, 459 N.W.2d at 789.
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marriage.3 7 9
FRAUD
WEST V. CARLSON
In West v. Carlson,a8 ° the North Dakota Supreme Court held
that restoration of status quo is a requirement for recission of a
contract, and a seller has a duty to disclose material facts known to
him which are not reasonably discoverable.3a '
Paul and Mary West, under a written agreement with Gary
and Jean Carlson, exchanged 400 acres of their land in Cass
County, North Dakota, for a lot owned by the Carlsons in Gallatin
County, Montana. 82 Along with the lot in Montana, the Wests
also received from the Carlsons $60,000 and an assignment of
right, title, and interest in an agreement with Daniel Henderson,
wherein Henderson made payments for the purchase of a house
and adjoining lot.3 3 A few months after the agreement was
signed by the parties, Henderson moved out of the house and
stopped making payments to the Wests because he learned that
the septic system to the lot was not located on the same tract of
land, the house was located on a property line, and the well had
dried up.3 4 Henderson sued both the Wests as assignees and the
Carlsons.38 5 Under an agreement between Henderson, Carlson,
and West, the house and adjacent land were sold to another
party.38 6 The Wests then sued the Carlsons, seeking recission of
the original exchange agreement because of fraud and failure of
consideration, and alternatively sought damages for breach of con-
tract and deceit.38 7 The district court refused to rescind the con-
tract because of the sale of the home and lot to another party prior
to trial, but awarded monetary damages to the Wests. 3 "8 The Carl-
sons appealed, and the Wests cross-appealed. 8 9
In their cross-appeal, the Wests argued that the trial court
erred in refusing to rescind the contract, because of the sale of the
379. Id.
380. 454 N.W.2d 307 (N.D. 1990).
381. West v. Carlson, 454 N.W.2d 307 (N.D. 1990).
382. West, 454 N.W.2d at 308.
383. Id.
384. Id. at 308-309.
385. Id. at 309.
386. West, 454 N.W.2d at 309.
387. Id.
388. Id.
389. Id.
322 [Vol. 67:291
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
house and lot to another party prior to trial.3 They contended
that by giving the Carlsons $60,000, the property, and the money
from the sale of the house and lot, the Carlsons were restored.391
The North Dakota Supreme Court determined that restoration of
status quo was impossible, because the subject of the assignment
had been sold to another party.392 The court agreed that in order
to rescind an agreement, the party seeking recission must restore
the preceding status quo.393
The Carlsons contended on appeal that the trial court erred in
awarding damages for fraud, because intent to deceive was not
established at trial.394  Reviewing the fraud statute, the court
found that suppression of known material facts and making of false
statements constituted actual fraud.395 The court concluded that
the facts and circumstances established actual fraud under the
statute. 39
6
The judgment of the trial court was affirmed.397
GUARDIAN AND WARD
KOPPERUD V. REILLY
In Kopperud v. Reilly,398 a personal representative of an
estate brought an action against a former conservator and the con-
servator's son to rescind a contract for the sale of decedent's farm-land. 399 Lorraine Reily was appointed conservator of Earl
Raymond Johnston's financial affairs in 1979. 400 Eddie Kopperud,
an attorney and personal representative under Johnston's will,
helped obtain the conservatorship order and advised Lorraine on
various transactions.4 0' In 1984, Lorraine spoke with Kopperud
regarding a proposed sale of 270 acres of Johnston's farmland to
390. West, 454 N.W.2d at 309.
391. Id.
392. Id.
393. Id.
394. West, 454 N.W.2d at 309.
395. Id. at 310. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-03-08 (1988) (acts committed that result in
actual fraud). The finding of the trial court showed that the Carlsons failed to disclose
material facts about the condition of the house and particulars of the agreement with
Henderson, and that the Carlsons also made false statements regarding payments from
Henderson. West, 454 N.W.2d at 310-311. The court rejected Carlsons' contention that
their statement to West that Henderson would have no trouble making payments was an
expression of opinion and, therefore, not fraudulent. Id. at 311.
396. Id.
397. Id. at 312.
398. 453 N.W.2d 598 (N.D. 1990).
399. Kopperud v. Reilly, 453 N.W.2d 598 (N.D. 1990).
400. Kopperud, 453 N.W.2d at 599.
401. Id.
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her son, Daniel.4°2 Kopperud reviewed the proposed contract for
sale and advised Lorraine that the interest rate was too low and
that an appraisal should be conducted prior to execution of the
contract.40 3 When Johnston passed away in 1986, his farmland was
valued at $371,250, with a rental value that would have yielded
the conservatorship $24,000 annually.4° Instead, under the con-
tract for deed with Daniel, the conservatorship would only receive
$16,961 annually.40 5 Learning this information, Kopperud, as per-
sonal representative of Johnston's estate, filed an action for recis-
sion of the contract for deed, alleging that Lorraine acted with a
conflict of interest by selling the land to her son at an unfair
price.4 06 The county court rescinded the contract and Lorraine
appealed.4 °7
Lorraine first contended that the county court lacked jurisdic-
tion to hear Kopperud's action for recission.40 The North Dakota
Supreme Court determined that the county court had jurisdiction
to exercise incidental powers for effective adjudication of probate
matters. 40 9 Because Kopperud's claim raised issues incidental to
the county court's jurisdiction over Johnston's estate, the court
concluded it had the authority to resolve the conflict of interest
410issue.
Secondly, Lorraine argued that the trial court erred in deny-
ing them a jury trial.41  The North Dakota Supreme Court found,
based upon the language of the statute, that the right to a jury trial
in a probate matter arises only in cases of a formal will dispute.41 2
Because Johnston's will was not in dispute, the court concluded
Lorraine had no right to a jury trial.41 3 Additionally, the court
reiterated the long standing principle that the right to a jury trial
does not exist in a suit of equity, such as that for recission of con-
tract.41 4 Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying a jury
402. Id.
403. Id. Although Lorraine raised the interest rate, an appraisal was never conducted,
and the land was consequently sold to her son for $180,000 to be paid over a period of 30
years. Id.
404. Kopperud, 453 N.W.2d at 599.
405. Id.
406. Id.
407. Kopperud, 453 N.W.2d at 599-600.
408. Id. at 600.
409. Id.
410. Id. at 601.
411. Kopperud, 453 N.W.2d at 601.
412. Id.
413. Id.
414. Id.
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trial.415
Finally, Lorraine asserted that the trial court erred in finding
a conflict of interest, because she did not benefit monetarily from
the sale to her son.4 18 Reviewing the findings of the county court,
the North Dakota Supreme Court found monetary benefit to be
unnecessary to support the conflict of interest claim in light of the
extremely low sale price of the land, the familial relationship
between Lorraine and Daniel, and various other factors.417
The judgment of the county court was affirmed.418
IMPLIED CONTRACT
IN RE ZENT
In In re Zent,419 the issue was whether the trial court should
have allowed a claim against the decedent's estate under an
implied contract theory.420 Ann Johnson and John A. Zent met in
1979 and continued a close relationship until John's death in
1988.421 During the three years prior to his death, John's condi-
tion progressively worsened due to back surgery, a series of
strokes, and Alzheimer's disease. 4  While John was incapacitated,
Ann took care of nearly all of his personal and domestic needs.4z
After John's death, Ann filed a claim for $31,025.00 against his
estate as compensation for her services.42 Ann's claim was disal-
lowed and the matter went to trial.42 The court found no express
or implied contract or unjust enrichment upon which Ann could
have based her claim.42 6
The supreme court held that the law will presume that Ann
expected compensation for services rendered by her to John, and
that she should recover for these services under an implied con-
tract.42 '7 The court noted that a benefit that is normally paid for is
a proper basis for an implied contract.4 As John's condition wors-
415. Koppesud, 453 N.W.2d at 601.
416. Id.
417. Id.
418. Id.
419. 459 N.W.2d 795 (N.D. 1990).
420. In re Zent, 459 N.W.2d 795, 798 (N.D. 1990).
421. Id. at 797.
422. Id.
423. Id. at 797-98.
424. In re Zent, 459 N.W.2d at 797.
425. Id. at 798. The personal representative for the estate was Howard A. Zent, John's
son. Id.
426. Id.
427. Id. at 801.
428. Id. at 798 (citing Cole v. Cole, 517 N.E.2d 1248 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988) and
RESTATEMENT OF RfTrTuTON § 1 comment c (1937)).
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ened, Ann spent about 8-10 hours a day at his house helping him to
dress, bathe, and take medication.42 9 The supreme court found
that Ann provided "skilled care" services to John, thereby result-
ing in the receipt of a "valuable benefit. ' 43 0 Even though Ann tes-
tified she expected no compensation, the services rendered by her
went well beyond the relationship shared by Ann and John.43 '
The court likened the services provided by Ann to those for which
one would normally expect to be compensated.432 For the pur-
poses of an implied contract, the court assumed Ann fully
expected compensation for her services.433 Thus, the supreme
court reversed the trial court and remanded for a determination of
the proper compensation to be awarded to Ann;434
INSTRUCTIONS TO JURIES
STATE V. MARKS
In State v. Marks,435 Debra K. Marks appealed her conviction
of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.43 8 On
January 15, 1989, the North Dakota Highway Patrol stopped
Debra's vehicle for speeding, and, in the course of the stop,
arrested her for the alcohol-related offense.437 Marks was taken to
the hospital for a blood test, the result of which showed a blood-
alcohol concentration of .18 percent.438 Marks was found guilty by
a jury and convicted.439 Marks appealed the conviction.440
On appeal to the North Dakota Supreme Court, Marks con-
tended that at trial the prosecutor made an improper comment in
his closing argument, which deprived her of a fair trial.441 During
the trial, after Marks attacked the validity of the blood test results,
the prosecution commented that defense counsel could have
tested leftover blood samples to recheck the validity of the tests.442
429. In re Zent, 459 N.W.2d at 799.
430. Id. at 800.
431. Id. The court held that "a statement of a claimant's unexpressed secret intention
does not defeat a claim of unjust enrichment." Id.
432. Id.
433. In re Zent, 459 N.W.2d at 800-01. In the case of an implied contract a court
should look beyond the facts of the case and decide what would be most equitable under
the circumstances. Id. at 800.
434. Id. at 801.
435. 452 N.W.2d 298 (N.D. 1990).
436. State v. Marks, 452 N.W.2d 298 (N.D. 1990).
437. Marks, 452 N.W.2d at 298-299.
438. Id. at 299.
439. Id.
440. Id.
441. Marks, 452 N.W.2d at 299.
442. Id.
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Marks' defense counsel objected to the comment, stating that it
illegally shifted the burden of proof to the defendant. 443 Marks
asserted on appeal that the illegal shifting of the burden of proof
was unfairly prejudicial to her case.444
The North Dakota Supreme Court, reviewing relevant case
law, determined that the statement was predictable and invited,
and therefore not prejudicial to Marks.445 The trial court is given
discretion to control and determine the scope of opening and clos-
ing arguments.4 46 In light of the sufficiency of the evidence
against the defendant, the failure of defense counsel to ask for a
curative instruction at the time the comment was made, and the
very brief attention that was given to the comment by the jury,
the court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in overruling Marks' motion for a mistrial.447
Marks also contended that the trial court erred in not allowing
her to submit proposed jury instructions following closing argu-
ments.448 Although litigants have a right to request instructions
upon the issues of the case, the trial court has the discretion to
deny the request if improperly submitted.449 Reviewing the rec-
ord of the trial court, the North Dakota Supreme Court found that
defense counsel had improperly requested the trial court to settle
jury instructions by failing to submit written instructions to the
court and had improperly requested the court to propose instruc-
tions to Marks' filings.450 Finding that the trial court's failure to
allow Marks to settle instructions did not affect her substantial
rights, the court concluded that the trial court's decision was not
clearly erroneous.45 '
The jury verdict and judgment of the county court were
affirmed.452
INSURANCE
NATIONAL FARMERS UNION PROPERTY AND CASUALTY
COMPANY V. KOVASH
In National Farmers Union Property and Casualty Company
443. Id. at 299-300.
444. Id.
445. Marks, 452 N.W.2d at 300-303.
446. Id.
447. Id. at 303.
448. Id.
449. Marks, 452 N.W.2d at 303. See N.D.R. CrIM. P. 30(b) (requested instructions).
450. Marks, 452 N.W.2d at 303-306.
451. Id.
452. Id. at 306.
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v. Kovash, 53 the North Dakota Supreme Court held that an
insurer need not investigate facts independent of the pleadings in
determining its duty to defend, when the complaint against the
insured alleges conduct specifically excluded by the insurance
policy.
4 54
Albert Kovash held three insurance policies with the National
Farmers Union Property and Casualty Company (National) and a
fourth policy with Farmers Union Mutual Insurance Company
(Mutual).455 When Kovash's neighbor brought an action against
him, alleging that Kovash maliciously closed a section line to the
public and used the neighbor's private road, Kovash sought help
from the insurance companies. 45 National and Mutual com-
menced a declaratory judgment action against Kovash, seeking a
determination that neither company had a duty to defend,
because intentional conduct was excluded from coverage under
the policies.45 7 The trial court held that National and Mutual had
no duty to defend, because Kovash's actions alleged in the com-
plaint were intentional and purposeful.458 Kovash appealed.45 9
Kovash contended on appeal to the North Dakota Supreme
Court that an insurer must investigate facts independent of the
pleadings before determining the insurer's duty to defend, rather
than relying solely on the allegations of the complaint. 46 0 Follow-
ing recent decisions on point, the court rejected Kovash's argu-
ments and concluded that the duty to defend arises from the
allegations contained in the complaint.48' If the acts alleged in the
complaint are specifically excluded under the insured's policy, the
insurer need not inquire into independent facts to determine its
duty to defend.462 The court held that National and Mutual had
no duty to defend Kovash, because the complaint against him
alleged intentional conduct that was specifically excluded in the
insurance policies.4 63
The judgment of the trial court was afirmed.4 4
453. 452 N.W.2d 307 (N.D. 1990).
454. National Farmers Union Property and Casualty Co. v. Kovash, 452 N.W.2d 307
(N.D. 1990).
455. National Farmers, 452 N.W.2d at 308.
456. Id.
.457. Id. at 309.
458. Id.
459. National Farmers, 452 N.W.2d at 309.
460. Id.
461. Id. (citing Kyllo v. Northland Chem. Co., 209 N.W.2d 629, 634 (N.D. 1973) and
Applegren v. Milbank Mutual Ins. Co., 268 N.W.2d 114 (N.D. 1978)).
462. National Farmers, 452 N.W.2d at 309-312.
463. Id. at 312.
464. Id.
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RA WLINGS V. FRUHWIRTH
In Rawlings v. Fruhwirth,465 the North Dakota Supreme
Court held that an insurance agent has a duty to exercise skill and
care which a reasonably prudent person engaged in the insurance
business would use under similar circumstances.4
Donald Rawlings' son was killed in a car accident involving
Charles Sweeney.4 7 At the time of the accident, Sweeney had a
limit of $25,000 on his automobile liability policy and carried an
umbrella policy covering liability of $250,000 to $1,250,000, leav-
ing a gap in coverage between the two policies.4 As a result of a
settlement between Sweeney and Rawlings in a wrongful death
action, Sweeney assigned his cause of action against two insurance
agents for the liability coverage gap to Rawlings. 469 Rawlings, as
assignee, brought a negligence action against Duane Larson, a
North Dakota insurance agent for failure to procure insurance
requested by Sweeney, failure to protect Sweeney from gaps in
coverage, and for making a negligent misrepresentation regarding
availability of the coverage. 470 The defendant moved for sum-
mary judgment in district court.47 ' The district court granted
summary judgment, concluding that because no special relation-
ship existed between Sweeney and Larson, the agent had no duty
to procure insurance to fill the gap.472 Rawlings appealed. 73
Because the North Dakota Supreme Court had not previously
set out a standard of care for insurance agents, the court found
case law from other jurisdictions to be instructive. 74 Reviewing
the case law, the court adopted the Minnesota standard of care
requiring insurance agents to exercise skill and care of a reason-
ably prudent person engaged in the insurance business under simi-
lar circumstances.475 This duty, the court found, is ordinarily
limited to the general duty of an agent to act in good faith and
follow instructions.476 Applying this standard to the facts of the
465. 455 N.W.2d 574 (N.D. 1990).
466. Rawlings v. Fruhwirth, 455 N.W.2d 574 (N.D. 1990).
467. Rawlings, 455 N.W.2d at 575.
468. Id.
469. Id.
470. Id.
471. Rawlings, 455 N.W.2d at 575.
472. Id.
473. Id.
474. ld. at 576.
475. Rawlings, 455 N.W.2d at 577. See Gabrielson v. Warnemunde, 455 N.W.2d 540
(Minn. 1989) (insurance agents are under a legal duty to exercise the skill and care that a
reasonable prudent person in similar circumstances would exercise while in the insurance
business).
476. Rawlings, 455 N.W.2d at 577.
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case, the court concluded that Larson fulfilled his duty by alerting
Sweeney to the gap in coverage and advising him to fill it.477 Find-
ing no special relationship to justify a higher level of duty and no
reliance on behalf of Sweeney, the court found Larson had no duty
to procure insurance to fill the gap.478
The judgment of the trial court was affirmed.479
JUDGMENT
THOMPSON V. GOETz
In Thompson v. Goetz,480 Roger and Phyllis Thompson
brought an action against William Goetz, their former attorney,
for malpractice, fraudulent misrepresentation, and breach of a set-
tlement agreement.48 . Because Goetz failed to answer the
Thompsons' complaint, a default judgment was entered against
him and a hearing was set to determine damages.482 Goetz moved
to vacate the default judgment for excusable neglect, supporting
his motion with affidavits indicating that he suffered from mental
disabilities. 48 The trial court denied Goetz's motion.48 Prior to
the hearing on damages, Goetz appealed.48 5
The first issue before the North Dakota Supreme Court was
whether the trial court's order denying Goetz's motion to vacate
was appealable, when the issue of damages had not yet been adju-
dicated.486 Although an order denying a motion to vacate a
default judgment is ordinarily appealable under section 28-27-02
of the North Dakota Century Code if claims remain unadjudi-
cated, the order must be accompanied by a Rule 54(b) order certi-
fying the default judgment as a final judgment.48 7 In this case, the
trial court's order was not accompanied by a 54(b) order, but the
supreme court nevertheless agreed to consider the issues on their
merits, because the partial default judgment would otherwise
eliminate Goetz's defenses to liability.4s
Goetz also attacked the trial court's grant of a default judg-
477. Id. at 578-580.
478. Id.
479. Id. at 580.
480. 455 N.W.2d 580 (N.D. 1990).
481. Thompson v. Goetz, 455 N.W.2d 580, 581 (N.D. 1990).
482. Thompson, 455 N.W.2d at 582.
483. Id.
484. Id.
485. Id. at 583.
486. Thompson, 455 N.W.2d at 583.
487. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-27-02 (relating to appealable orders and N.D.R.
Civ. P. 54(b)).
488. Thompson, 455 N.W.2d at 583.
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ment without requiring the Thompsons to produce supporting evi-
dence.489 The North Dakota Supreme Court held that proof must
be submitted by the plaintiff before a default judgment can be
granted, except in cases where a certain sum is sought.49 0 Because
the trial court granted a default judgment without a submission of
proof by the plaintiffs, the court concluded that the trial court
abused its discretion in refusing to vacate the judgment.49 1
Reviewing the supporting affidavits submitted with Goetz's
motion to vacate, which identified his psychological disabilities
and suicidal thinking, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded
that Goetz's mental disabilities were the cause of his failure to
answer the Thompsons' complaint.49 2 The court found mental
incapacity to be an appropriate ground for vacating a default judg-
ment and held that the trial court erred in refusing to grant
Goetz's motion.493
Finally, the court responded to Goetz's claim that the plain-
tiffs' attorney should have been disqualified under Rule 3.7 of the
North Dakota Rules of Professional Conduct, because he was a pos-
sible witness in the case.494 Reviewing Rule 3.7, the court deter-
mined that the mere possibility that opposing counsel may be
called as a witness does not warrant disqualification under the
rule.495
The supervisory writ was granted and the trial court was
directed to vacate the default judgment.49 6
MANDAMUS
NORTH DAKOTA COUNCIL OF SCHOOL ADMINISTRATORS V.
SINNER
In North Dakota Council of School Administrators v. Sin-
ner,497 the North Dakota Supreme Court held the Director of
Budget had no clear duty to restore foundation aid payments, and
that the statute allowing the Director to reduce appropriations
489. Id. at 583-585.
490. Thompson, 455 N.W.2d at 584.
491. Id. at 585.
492. Id. at 587.
493. Id.
494. Thompson, 455 N.W.2d at 587. See N.D. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY RULE 3.7 (an attorney may not act as an advocate in a case in which it is
likely that he will be a necessary witness).
495. Thompson, 455 N.W.2d at 587-588.
496. Id. at 588.
497. 458 N.W.2d 280 (N.D. 1990).
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was not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority.49
In 1987, the North Dakota legislature made general fund
appropriations based on projections that the state would have
$1.055 billion in general fund revenues for the 1987-89 bien-
ium . 4 9 9 Responding to 1988 forecasts that projected less reve-
nues than expected, the Director of the Office of Management and
Budget, Dick Rayl, uniformly reduced all general fund agency
budgets by two percent, pursuant to power given to him by sec-
tion 54-44.1-12 of the North Dakota Century Code. °° As a result
of the reductions, foundation aid grants to local school districts
were reduced.50 ' When revised projections showed that revenues
would likely exceed the original $1.055 billion projections, the
school districts asked for funds to be restored to the levels first
appropriated by the legislature in 1987. °2 Although actual gen-
eral fund revenues for the biennium did exceed the projected
amounts, the funds were not restored.5 °3 The North Dakota
School Administrators brought an action against Governor George
Sinner, Dick Rayl, and the Superintendent of Public Instruction,
Wayne Sanstead, seeking a writ of mandamus to compel restora-
tion of the allotted funds.50 4 The district court entered an order
dismissing the action.50 5 The School Districts and Council
appealed.' °
The first issue raised on appeal to the North Dakota Supreme
Court was whether Rayl had an absolute duty to restore funds
when revenue projections improved, pursuant to section 54-44.1-
12 of the North Dakota Century Code. °7 The School Districts
asserted that a writ of mandamus should issue, because Rayl had
clear statutory duty to restore funds pursuant to section 54-44.1-
12.508 Reviewing the language of the statute, the court found that
it specifically allowed Rayl to make allotments reducing available
funds when revenues were estimated to be insufficient, but did not
impose a duty on Rayl to restore the funds when the revenue pro-
498. North Dakota Council of School Adm'r v. Sinner, 458 N.W.2d 280 (N.D. 1990).
499. Sinner, 458 N.W.2d at 281.
500. Id.
501. Id.
502. Id. at 282.
503. Sinner, 458 N.W.2d at 282.
504. Id.
505. Id.
506. Id.
507. Sinner, 458 NW.2d at 283. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 54-44.1-12 (1989) (relating to
the director of budget's control over the rate of expenditures).
508. Sinner, 458 N.W.2d at 284.
332 [Vol. 67:291
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
jections improved.50 9 Because the School Districts failed to show
that Rayl had a clear duty to restore the funds, the court con-
cluded that the trial court did not err in refusing to issue a writ of
mandamus. 510
Next, the court considered the School Districts' contention
that section 54-44.1-12 of the North Dakota Century Code, which
allowed Rayl to reduce appropriations, was an unconstitutional
delegation of the legislature's authority to make appropriations. 51'
Applying the doctrine of nondelegation, the court concluded sec-
tion 54-44.1-12 gave Rayl authority to control the rate of expendi-
tures, but only within specifically defined parameters, and
therefore did not constitute an unconstitutional delegation of leg-
islative authority. 512
The order of the district court was affirmed.51 3
MENTAL HEALTH
Ex REL. L.B.
Ex rel. L.B.51 a involved the appeal of an individual who was
involuntarily committed as a "mentally ill person requiring treat-
ment."51 5 The appellant challenged the county court's finding
that he was within the statutory definition of a "mentally ill person
requiring treatment," and also argued that the North Dakota State
Hospital failed to present a statutorily required listing of alterna-
tive treatment at his treatment hearing.5 16
Reviewing the county court's findings, the North Dakota
Supreme Court concluded that clear and convincing evidence
existed that the appellant was a "mentally ill person requiring
treatment" within the meaning of the statute.5 1 7 The appellant
had a history of violence and aggressive behavior when he con-
sumed alcohol, lacked contact with reality, lacked insight and
judgment, and posed a serious risk of harm to himself and
others.518
509. Id.
510. Id. The court noted the 1989 legislature could have taken action to restore the
allotted funds, but did not do so. Id.
511. Sinner, 458 N.W.2d at 285.
512. Id. at 285-286.
513. Id. at 296.
514. 452 NW.2d 75 (N.D. 1990).
515. Ex rel. L.B., 452 N.W.2d 75, 76 (N.D. 1990). See N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.1-02
(defining who is a "mentally ill person" and a "person requiring treatment").
516. Ex reL L.B., 452 N.W.2d at 76.
517. Id. at 77-78.
518. Id.
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The North Dakota Supreme Court also addressed the appel-
lant's contention that the North Dakota State Hospital failed to
supply a listing of alternative treatment options, as required by
section 25-03.1-21(1) of the North Dakota Century Code.519 The
court found that the State Hospital did submit the correct report
but listed no alternative treatment options because of the appel-
lant's resistance to treatment.5 20 The court held that the failure to
list alternative treatment options in this case did not render the
report void under the statute.5 2
The judgment of the county court was affirmed. 52
MORTGAGES
FARM CREDIT BANK OF ST. PAUL V. MARTINSON
In Farm Credit Bank of St. Paul v. Martinson,5n the issue was
whether twelve grain bins built by the renter on leased farmland
continued to be owned by the renter after foreclosure proceedings
upon the farmland.524 John Martinson leased farmland from his
mother in Dickey County, North Dakota.5" Prior to 1981, John
erected twelve grain bins on the rented farmland.526 In 1981, his
mother received a loan from Farm Credit Bank secured by the
farmland rented to John. 27 Farm Credit Bank foreclosed upon
the property and was high bidder at the sheriff's sale.5' The bank
eventually received deeds to the land on which the grain bins
were located.529 In an action to evict the Martinsons from the
farmland, the county court determined that the grain bins were
fixtures on the farmland and therefore property of Farm Credit
Bank.5 30
. The supreme court held that, absent notice of ownership filed
pursuant to section 47-06-04 of the North Dakota Century Code,
the grain bins were property of Farm Credit Bank.53" ' Section 47-
519. Id. at 78. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.1-21(1) (the state hospital or other
treatment facility must provide the court with report assessing alternatives to
hospitalization).
520. Ex rel. L.B., 452 N.W.2d at 78.
521. Id.
522. Id. at 78-79.
523. 453 N.W.2d 816 (N.D. 1990).
524. Farm Credit Bank of St. Paul v. Martinson, 453 N.W.2d 816, 817-18 (N.D. 1990).
525. Id. at 817.
526. Id.
527. Id.
528. Martinson, 453 N.W.2d at 817.
529. Id.
530. Id.
531. Id. at 818. See N.D. CENT CODE § 47-06-04 (1978) (when a tenant may remove
fixtures from land).
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06-04 of the North Dakota Century Code allows an agricultural
tenant eight months after he vacates leased property to remove
fixtures erected by him prior to filing of any deed on the prop-
erty.53 2 Such removal is proper only if the tenant filed a notice of
intention to remove the fixture with the register of deeds soon
after its construction.533 The court noted that Farm Credit Bank
filed their mortgage after the grain bins were built, and John had
not filed a notice of his ownership.5 34 Therefore, the supreme
court affirmed the county court's finding that Farm Credit Bank
owned the grain bins upon foreclosure of the rental property.535
FIRST STATE BANK OF NEW ROCKFORD V. ANDERSON
In First State Bank of New Rockford v. Anderson,536 Warren
Anderson appealed the trial court's entry of a deficiency judgment
following foreclosure and sale of 200 acres of his land.5 37 In 1984,
Anderson executed a mortgage to the First State Bank, which was
prepared on a standard Short Term Mortgage Redemption Act
Form, even though the acreage of the property exceeded limits
for that type of mortgage.5 3 Although the form stated that the
Short Term Act would govern, the trial court found that use of the
form did not preclude the granting of a deficiency judgment.5 39
The North Dakota Supreme Court noted the legislature's pub-
lic policy against deficiency judgments.5 4 ° Construing North
Dakota foreclosure statutes strictly in the mortgagor's favor, the
court held that the bank waived its right to a deficiency judgment
when it agreed to be bound by the Short Term Mortgage Redemp-
tion Act.- 4 Whether the form was used by mistake or inadver-
tence, the court concluded that when a lender agrees at the outset
of the transaction to be bound by the Act, it may not later elect a
more beneficial procedure at foreclosure. 42
The judgment of the district court was reversed.5 43
532. Martinson, 453 N.W.2d at 818.
533. Id.
534. Id.
535. Id. at 818-19.
536. 452 N.W.2d 90 (N.D. 1990).
537. First State Bank of New Rockford v. Anderson, 452 N.W.2d 90, 91 (N.D. 1990).
538. Id. at 91. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-19.1 (the Short Term Mortgage Redemption
Act applies to parcels of land not exceeding 40 acres and allows the parties to agree to a
shortened redemption period, with the lender foregoing its right to seek a deficiency
judgment).
539. Anderson, 452 N.W.2d at 91.
540. Id. at 92.
541. Id.
542. Anderson, 452 N.W.2d at 92, 93.
543. Id. at 93.
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LANG V. BANK OF NORTH DAKOTA
In Lang v. Bank of North Dakota, Ernest Lang appealed
the dismissal of his claim for deprivation of statutory
postforeclosure opportunities.54 5 Lang gave a first mortgage on
his farmland to the Bank of North Dakota (Bank) pursuant to a
board of university and school land investment program. The
Bank, acting for the board, foreclosed on the mortgage when Lang
became delinquent.5 47  During Lang's statutory redemption
period, the Bank sold a sheriff's certificate on Lang's land to a sec-
ond mortgagee, the Bank of Steele.5 8 Lang filed a claim, contend-
ing that the sale to the Bank of Steele denied his statutory
opportunity to repurchase the land at a private sale under chapter
15-07 of the North Dakota Century Code.- 9 The trial court held
the statute inapplicable and dismissed Lang's claim.550 Lang
appealed.55 '
Lang contended on appeal to the North Dakota Supreme
Court that statutes in effect at the time of the mortgage contract
afforded him the opportunity to repurchase his land prior to public
sale of the property.552 The court proceeded to review the unique
statutory provisions governing the board of university and school
lands loans to farmers and its underlying legislative policy.553
Because the purpose of the program is to benefit and protect farm-
ers, the court held that the bank must follow the statutory plan
when foreclosing a mortgage, rather than deal with the transac-
tion in a standard commercial setting. 54 Therefore, the court
found Lang's postforeclosure privileges may have been deprived
by the Bank, if the sale of the sheriff's certificate failed to take
Lang's statutory rights into consideration.5"5
The trial court's summary judgment was reversed and the
544. 453 N.W.2d 118 (N.D. 1990). In Lange I, Lang v. Bank of North Dakota, 377
N.W.2d 575 (N.D. 1985), Lang sued the Bank for wrongful foreclosure and the trial court
dismissed for failure to state a claim. On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed
and remanded, finding that a claim did exist.. On remand the trial court again dismissed
Lang's claim.
545. Lang v. Bank of North Dakota, 453 N.W.2d 118 (N.D. 1990).
546. Lang, 453 N.W.2d at 120. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-03-04 (1988) (mandates the
Board to invest part of its permanent funds in first mortgages on farmland in North Dakota).
547. Lang, 453 N.W.2d at 118-120.
548. Id. at 118.
549. Id. at 119.
550. Id. at 119-120.
551. Lang, 453 N.W.2d at 120.
552. Id.
553. Id. at 120-122.
554. Id. at 122.
555. Lang, 453 N.W.2d at 122.
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case remanded for trial.5 5 6
NOR WEST BANK NORTH DAKOTA V. FREDERICK
In Norwest Bank North Dakota v. Frederik,557 the issues
were: (1) whether an installment mortgage was ambiguous
because the date of final payment was incorrect; (2) whether the
trial court incorrectly decided that as a matter of law, a creditor's
notice before foreclosure complied with North Dakota Century
Code section 32-19-21; and (3) whether defendant, under section
32-19-12 of the North Dakota Century Code, should be allowed to
pay a delinquent installment at trial.558 Norwest Bank of North
Dakota brought a foreclosure action against Frederick for default
on an $80,000 loan.5 9 Norwest elected to accelerate the loan and
informed Frederick of its intentions in its notice before foreclo-
sure.5w The same notice informed Frederick that he could "cure
the defaults, decelerate the debt and reinstate the loan," if he paid
the past due installments within thirty days after notice. 561 Fred-
erick did not pay within thirty days, but did offer to pay at the
time of trial.1 2 Norwest would not accept the payment and stated
that the debt was accelerated. M3 The trial court allowed Norwest
the foreclosure and Frederick appealed.'
At trial, Frederick claimed that the note and mortgage were
ambiguous, because they listed the date of final payment incor-
rectly.' However, Frederick admitted at trial that the date was a
mistake and had been amended.5 The supreme court held that
since the documents had been corrected, his argument was "with-
out merit. 567
North Dakota Century Code section 32-19-21 provides, in
pertinent part, that a notice for foreclosure will contain "[t]he
amount due for principal, interest, and taxes paid by the owner of
the mortgage, stated separately."' ' 8 Frederick claimed that
Norwest had not complied with the statute because they had listed
556. Id. at 123.
557. 452 N.W.2d 316 (N.D. 1990).
558. Norwest Bank North Dakota v. Frederick, 452 N.W.2d 316, 317 (N.D. 1990).
559. Id.
560. Id.
561. Id.
562. Frederick, 452 N.W.2d at 317.
563. Id.
564. Id.
565. Id.
566. Frederick, 452 N.W.2d at 317.
567. Id.
568. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-19-21 (1976).
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the interest incorrectly and had not listed the taxes paid by the
mortgagee.569 The supreme court decided that Frederick did not
present evidence at the trial level to meet his burden of proving
that the interest stated was incorrect.5 7 0  They also found that
since Norwest did not pay any taxes, they did not have to list the
taxes separately.571
Frederick also averred that, as a matter of law, the court must
accept his tender of payment at trial for the overdue install-
ments.5 7 2 He urged the court to overrule Metropolitan Building
and Loan Association v. Weinberger,5 7 3 which allowed a creditor
the right to accelerate a debt.574 He claimed that State Bank of
Kenmare v. Lindberg57 5 was inconsistent with this proposition,
and a mortgage could not be accelerated in violation of North
Dakota Century Code section 32-19-12.576 The supreme court dis-
tinguished the cases by showing the factual differences between
Lindberg and this case.577 The supreme court held that North
Dakota Century Code section 32-19-12 does not apply where a
mortgagee accelerates the debt after the thirty-day period has
run.578 Thus, the court affirmed the trial court's decision.579
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
PELKEY V. CITY OF FARGO
In Pelkey v. City of Fargo,580 the North Dakota Supreme
569. Frederick, 452 N.W.2d at 318.
570. Id.
571. Id.
572. Id. North Dakota Century Code section 32-19-12 provides:
Whenever an action shall be commenced for the foreclosure of a mortgage
upon which there shall be due any interest, or any portion or installment of the
principal, and there shall be other portions or installments to become due
subsequently, the complaint shall be dismissed upon the defendant's bringing
into court at any time before decree of sale the principal and interest due, with
costs and disbursements.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-19-12 (1976). Frederick offered to pay the past due amounts at the
time of trial. Frederick, 452 N.W.2d at 317.
573. 67 N.D. 627, 275 N.W.2d 638 (1937).
574. Metropolitan Bldg. and Loan Ass'n. v. Weinberger, 67 N.D. 627, 275 N.W.2d 638
(1937).
575. 436 N.W.2d 12 (N.D. 1989).
576. Frederick, 452 N.W.2d at 318.
577. Id. In Lindberg, the supreme court reversed a foreclosure judgment because the
notice before foreclosure stated that the entire debt had to be paid within thirty days. Id.
North Dakota Century Code section 32-19-28 only requires that if, within thirty days after
notice of foreclosure, you pay past due installments that caused the default, then the
mortgage is reinstated. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-19-28 (1976). The notice of foreclosure in
the case at bar complied with section 32-19-28, and thus was distinguishable from Lindberg.
578. Frederick, 452 N.W.2d at 319.
579. Id.
580. 453 N.W.2d 801 (N.D. 1990).
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Court held that the power of the people to initiate and refer legis-
lation did not include power to refer local laws and ordinances.Ml
In 1988, the voters of the City of Fargo approved a charter
amendment authorizing a one-half percent sales and use tax to
finance the construction of a domed facility.s 2 John L. Pelkey, Jr.,
Steven Plinke, and Edward Christianson submitted a proposal to
repeal the authorization of the sales and use tax to the Board of
City Commissioners, who refused to submit the proposal to the
voters.583 Pelkey then requested the district court issue a writ of
mandamus to compel the City to submit the repeal proposal to a
vote.m4 The district court denied the request, 'citing section 40-
05.1-09 of the North Dakota Century Code, which prohibits the
submission of proposals to amend or repeal home rule charters
more than every two years. 5  Pelkey appealed, asserting that sec-
tion 40-05.1-09 of the North Dakota Century Code is an unconsti-
tutional restriction on the people's power to initiate legislation.'
The City of Fargo moved to dismiss the appeal for mootness.m7
The North Dakota Supreme Court first addressed the motion
of the City of Fargo.5s 8 The City asserted that article 10, section
16 of the North Dakota Constitution prohibits the repeal of ordi-
nances providing for the payment of debt until the debt is paid.
Therefore, the petitioners' proposal to repeal could not be submit-
ted to the voters."8 9 Although the court agreed with the City, they
nevertheless found that the issue raised was a matter of great pub-
lic interest and concern and refused to dismiss the case for
mootness.5 °
The petitioners asserted that section 40-05.1-09 of the North
Dakota Century Code was unconstitutional as a restriction of the
people's right to initiate legislation.5 9 1 Applying general princi-
ples of statutory construction, the court considered all sections of
article III of the Constitution and determined that a petition to
581. Pelkey v. City of Fargo, 453 N.W.2d 801 (N.D. 1990).
582. Pelkey, 453 N.W.2d at 802. The amendment was adopted in early 1989. Id.
583. Id.
584. Id.
585. Pelkey, 453 N.W.2d at 802-803. North Dakota Century Code section 40-05.1-09
provides that: "Any proposal to amend or repeal home rule charters shall not be submitted
to the electorate more often than every two years." N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-05.1-09 (1988).
586. Pelkey, 453 N.W.2d at 803.
587. Id.
588. Id.
589. Id. See N.D. CONST. art. 10, § 16 (all laws or ordinances are irrepealable until the
debt is paid).
590. Pelkey, 453 N.W.2d at 803. Generally, an appeal will be dismissed if issues
become moot. Id.
591. Id. at 804. See N.D. CONST. art. 3, § 1.
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initiate must involve a state law that will be voted on in a state-
wide election.592 Therefore, the court held that section 40-05.1-09
was not unconstitutional, because the power of initiative and refer-
endum does not apply to local laws and ordinances.59 z
The judgment of the district court was affrmed. 9 4
NEGLIGENCE
ERICKSON V. SCHWAN
In Erickson v. Schwan,no5 the children of Dale Erickson
brought a wrongful death action in district court against Dennis
Schwan, Barry Schwan, and Timothy Began.596 Dale Erickson was
killed when he was run over by the rear wheels of a tractor-trailer
while it was being loaded with grain.5 9 Began was the driver of
the vehicle and an employee of the Schwans.5 98 The jury appor-
tioned negligence at 90% to Erickson and 10% to Regan. 99 Con-
sequently, the district court dismissed the action. The court denied
a motion for a new trial and the Ericksons appealed.6° °
The first issue the North Dakota Supreme Court addressed
was whether the district court erred in refusing to give the Erick-
sons' requested instruction on momentary forgetfulness.6 °'
Reviewing the facts, the court found no evidence, either direct or
circumstantial, that Erickson momentarily forgot the danger. °2
Because an instruction with no basis in the evidence would leave
the jury to theorize as to whether Erickson momentarily forgot
the danger, the court concluded that the district court did not err
in refusing to give the momentary forgetfulness instruction. 3
The Ericksons next asserted that the trial court erred in refus-
ing to give their requested instruction on duty of care. 6 4 The
592. Pelkey, 453 N.W.2d at 804.
593. Id. at 805.
594. Id. Justice VandeWalle dissented to the majority's determination that the appeal
was moot, because he believed the courts were not powerless since the bonds had not yet
been issued. Id.
595. 453 N.W.2d 765 (N.D. 1990).
596. Erickson v. Schwan, 453 N.W.2d 765, 766 (N.D. 1990).
597. Erickson, 453 N.W.2d at 766.
598. Id. at 767.
599. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-07 (1987) (when negligence on the part of the
plaintiff is greater than the negligence of the defendant, recovery is barred).
600. Erickson, 453 N.W.2d at 767.
601. Id. The momentary forgetfulness doctrine provides that if a plaintiff exposes
himself to a danger of which he has knowledge but momentarily forgets, the forgetfulness is
not contributory negligence, unless it was lack of ordinary care to not have kept the danger
in mind. Id.
602. Id. at 769.
603. Id.
604. Id.
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supreme court concluded that a trial court is only required to
instruct the jury as to the applicable law of the case and need not
give instructions in the specific language requested by a party.6°5
Finally, the court considered the issue of juror misconduct.6°6
The Ericksons, relying on a jury foreman's affidavit that stated that
bias and confusion existed among the jurors, tried to establish thatjuror misconduct during deliberations had occurred.' ° The court
refused to admit the juror's affidavit, stating that affidavits are only
admissible to show that prejudicial information or outside influ-
ence was brought to bear upon a juror or that the verdict was
arrived at by chance.'
The judgment of the district court was affirmed.8° °
PLEA BARGAINING
STATE V. SCHUMACHER
In State v. Schumacher,61 ° the North Dakota Supreme Court
held that the failure of a trial court to advise a criminal defendant
of mandatory minimum sentence prior to entry of guilty plea
required that defense be allowed to withdraw his plea.611
Marcus Schumacher was charged with murder and attempted
murder.61 2 He later pleaded guilty to reduced charges of man-
slaughter and reckless endangerment pursuant to a plea agree-
ment.61 3 The court accepted Schumacher's plea, but failed to
advise him of the mandatory minimum sentence prior to entry of
the plea.61 4 Schumacher subsequently filed a motion to withdraw
his guilty plea, asserting that the trial court did not advise him of
the mandatory sentence, as required by Rule 11 of the North
Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure.61 After two evidentiary
hearings, the trial court determined that Rule 11 had been sub-
stantially complied with.6" 6 Schumacher appealed.617
The state conceded on appeal to the North Dakota Supreme
605. Erickson, 453 N.W.2d at 769.
606. Id. at 770.
607. Id.
608. Id.
609. Erickson, 453 N.W.2d at 770.
610. 452 N.W.2d 345 (N.D. 1990).
611. State v. Schumacher, 452 N.W.2d 345 (N.D. 1990).
612. Schumacher, 452 N.W.2d at 346.
613. Id.
614. Id.
615. Id. See N.D.R. CRIM. P. 11(bX2) (requiring the court to personally address the
defendant of the mandatory minimum sentence prior to accepting a guilty plea).
616. Schumacher, 452 N.W.2d at 346.
617. Id.
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Court that the trial court did not advise Schumacher of the
mandatory minimum sentence prior to accepting his guilty
plea.618 However, the state argued that Rule 11 was substantially
complied with by Schumacher's awareness of the sentence,
defense counsel's explanation of the sentence, and defense coun-
sel's request to impose the minimum sentence at the sentencing
hearing.61 9 The court found that the purpose of Rule 11 is to
ensure that the record affirmatively reflects a knowing and volun-
tary decision by the defendant, and concluded that the failure to
meet the requirements of Rule 11 cannot be cured by the fact that
Schumacher may have been aware of the mandatory minimum
sentence.620 In order to fulfill these requirements, a trial court
must advise the defendant of, and determine that he understands
the effect of, the mandatory minimum sentence prior to the entry
of the plea.6 2 ' The court concluded that if a defendant is not so
advised, he is entitled to withdraw his plea of guilty.6 1
The order denying Schumacher's motion to withdraw his
guilty plea was reversed and the case remanded to the district
court.6z
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
STATE V. HUETHER
In State v. Huether,62 4 the state appealed from an order sup-
pressing evidence obtained in a warrantless search.625 David
Huether was stopped by a state highway patrol officer for speed-
ing, and in the process of the stop, Huether admitted that he had
been drinking.6 26 The officer suspected an open container and
obtained Huether's permission to search the vehicle.6 27 Upon a
search of the vehicle, the officer noticed a small paper bag pushed
partly under the front seat.6 ' The officer pulled the bag out and
opened it, finding 33 packets of a controlled substance.629
Huether denied ownership of the bag and knowledge of its con-
618. Id.
619. Id.
620. Schumacher, 452 N.W.2d at 346-348.
621. Id. at 347.
622. Id. at 348.
623. Id.
624. 453 N.W.2d 778 (N.D. 1990).
625. State v. Huether, 453 N.W.2d 778 (N.D. 1990).
626. Huether, 453 N.W.2d at 780.
627. Id.
628. Id.
629. Id.
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tents.8 30 He was arrested and charged with possession with intent
to deliver a controlled substance. 63 1 At trial, Huether moved to
suppress the evidence of the controlled substance. 2 The district
court ordered the evidence suppressed, finding that the search
exceeded -Huether's consent, was not supported by a probable
cause, and violated Huether's expectation of privacy.63 The state
appealed. 34
The state initially argued that when Huether stated that the
bag was not his and that he had no knowledge of it, he relin-
quished his expectation of privacy.635 The North Dakota Supreme
Court found that disavowal of ownership was not enough to relin-
quish Huether's right of privacy, especially when the bag was
located in an area where there was a legitimate privacy expecta-
tion. 6  An effort to disclaim ownership cannot alone constitute
abandonment. 7
Next, the state asserted that the search of the bag was within
Huether's consent.6 8 The court rejected this argument, stating
that the purpose of the search was limited to finding an open
container, and the scope of the officer's search was defined by the
object of the search.639 The officer overlooked a more obvious bag
that contained a six-pack of beer and instead opened a concealed
bag which had neither the size nor shape of a beverage
container.640 The court agreed with the trial court's finding that
the bag could not have been reasonably expected to contain an
alcoholic beverage container; therefore, the search exceeded the
scope of Huether's consent.r4 l
The North Dakota Supreme Court rejected the state's prob-
able cause argument on the same grounds.642
The order of the trial court was affirmed. 43
630. Huether, 453 N.W.2d at 780.
631. Id.
632. Huether, 453 N.W.2d at 780.
633. Id.
634. Id.
635. Id.
636. Huether, 453 N.W.2d at 781-782.
637. Id.
638. Id. at 781.
639. Id. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (constitutional scope of a
warrantless search of an automobile is defined by the object of that search).
640. Huether, 453 N.W.2d at 782.
641. Id.
642. Id. at 783.
643. Id.
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STATE V. RODE
In State v. Rode, 4 Mark Rode challenged, as a violation of his
fourth amendment fights, the testing by law enforcement agents
of a package addressed to him which contained cocaine .4 A pri-
vate delivery company opened an undeliverable package
addressed to the defendant and discovered a substance inside that
appeared to be cocaine.1 6 The delivery company contacted law
enforcement agents, who promptly took the package to the James-
town law enforcement center for testing. 47 The substance was
positively identified as cocaine. 641 The law enforcement agents
then arranged for the package to be resealed and delivered to
Rode, who was then arrested for drug possession.649 Rode chal-
lenged the officers' testing of the package contents under the
fourth amendment to the United States Constitution and article 1,
section 8 of the North Dakota Constitution. ° The trial court
granted Rode's motion to suppress the evidence and the state
appealed.8 5 1
Because the actions of the delivery service were non-govern-
mental and did not fall under the purview of the fourth amend-
ment, the degree of the invasion of Rode's privacy was tested from
the point that it exceeded a private search. 2 The North Dakota
Supreme Court found that once the delivery service opened the
package, the subsequent testing by law enforcement agents to
identify the substance only remotely compromised Rode's expec-
tation of privacy. 3 Balancing the interests of the government
against Rode's privacy interests, the court held that the purpose of
the test was merely to identify whether or not the substance was
cocaine and did not constitute a search under the fourth amend-
ment or the North Dakota Constitution.'
The trial court's suppression order was reversed. 55
644. 456 N.W.2d 769 (N.D. 1990).
645. State v. Rode, 456 N.W.2d 769 (N.D. 1990).
646. Rode, 456 N.W.2d at 769. The package was opened by company employees
pursuant to a company policy regarding undeliverable packages. Id.
647. Id.
648. Id.
649. Id.
650. Rode, 456 N.W.2d at 770.
651. Id.
652. Id.
653. Id.
654. Rode, 456 N.W.2d at 771.
655. Id.
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SENTENCING
STATE v. HANSON
In State v. Hanson,5 the failure of a court to take action to
reduce a criminal sentence within 120 days from the original
imposition of the sentence was held to foreclose the court's power
to reduce the sentence.5 7
Thomas E. Hanson pleaded guilty, under a plea agreement, to
two counts of gross sexual imposition and was sentenced to serve
concurrent six-year terms in the North Dakota State Penitentiary,
with two years suspended.6m Hanson moved to reduce his sen-
tence pursuant to Rule 35(b) of the North Dakota Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure." The trial court granted Hanson's motion and
suspended four years of Hanson's sentence.Y6 ° The state
requested that the trial court reconsider its reduction in sentence
on the basis that Rule 35(b) requires that a court act to reduce a
sentence within 120 days from the date of sentencing.66 The trial
court denied the state's motion to reconsider, reasoning that once
a motion is timely made, the 120-day requirement is met.662 The
state appealed.'
In determining whether the 120-day time limit imposed by
Rule 35(b) of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure
applied to the time in which a motion must be made or in which a
court must act, the North Dakota Supreme Court looked to the
plain language of Rule 35(b) and its explanatory note.664 The court
found that the 120-day limit clearly applied to the time in which
the court must act on a reduction in sentence.66 The trial court
was incorrect in reducing Hanson's sentence more than 120 days
after the original sentencing.' The failure of a sentencing court
to act within the 120-day limit forecloses the court's power to
reduce a criminal sentence.6 7
656. 452 N.W.2d 329 (N.D. 1990).
657. State v. Hanson, 452 N.W.2d 329 (N.D. 1990).
658. Hanson, 452 N.W.2d at 329.
659. Id. See N.D.R. CRIM. P. 35(b) (reduction of sentence).
660. Hanson, 452 N.W.2d at 329.
661. Id.
662. Id. at 329-330.
663. Hanson, 452 N.W.2d at 330.
664. Id. The explanatory note to Rule 35(b) of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal
Procedure states: "'It should be noted that the period is not defined as the time in which the
motion may be made, but is rather the time in which the court may act." N.D.R. CRiM. P.
35(b).
665. Hanson, 452 N.W.2d at 330.
666. Id.
667. Id.
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The North Dakota Supreme Court reinstated Hanson's origi-
nal sentence.68s
SOCIAL SECURITY AND PUBLIC WELFARE
NEWLAND V. JOB SER VICE. NORTH DAKOTA
In Newland v. Job Service North Dakota,6 1 the North Dakota
Supreme Court held that an employee's difficulty in obtaining
child care due to a change from standard work hours to on-call
schedule with unpredictable hours may constitute good cause for
quitting attributable to the employer, if the employee makes a
good faith effort to preserve employment. 70
Joy Newland was employed by Dakota Drug, Inc. of Minot for
one and one-half years as a utility clerk and order filler.67 1 Her
work hours were from 7:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. 672 In 1989, the com-
pany informed Newland that her shift would change to an irregu-
lar schedule running from 4:30 a.m. to 8:30 p.m. or later,
depending upon the work that needed to be done. 73 Although
the schedule change did not involve an increase or decrease in
hours, the time when work was to begin and end each day was
unpredictable. 4 Unable to secure care for her children on the
new schedule, Newland quit her job and filed for unemployment
compensation benefits. 5 Job Service denied benefits, determin-
ing that Newland quit for personal reasons that did not constitute
good cause attributable to the employer.676 Newland appealed. 7
Newland contended that Job Service erred in concluding she
voluntarily quit her job without good cause attributable to Dakota
Drug, Inc..678 Looking to public policy supporting the unemploy-
ment compensation system-that benefits should be provided to
persons unemployed through no fault of their own-the North
Dakota Supreme Court construed provisions of the act in New-
668. Id. at 330-331. Although the court's ruling negates the trial court's power to
reduce Hanson's sentence, the court stated that Hanson still had the opportunity to apply to
the parole board at anytime for early release and the parole board would review his
sentence periodically. Id.
669. 460 N.W.2d at 118 (N.D. 1990).
670. Newland v. Job Service North Dakota, 460 N.W.2d 118 (N.D. 1990).
671. Newland, 460 N.W.2d at 120.
672. Id.
673. Id.
674. Id.
675. Newland, 460 N.W.2d at 120.
676. Id.
677. Id.
678. Id.
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land's favor.679 The court determined that although child care
alone is not a condition attributable to an employer, it may com-
bine with other factors to constitute good cause for quitting.'8 0 In
her application for benefits, Newland had given the shift change
and child care problems as reasons for quitting, and the court
stated that Job Service was required to consider all reasons which
may have combined to make Newland quit, even if one factor
alone may be disqualifying."8 Considering the shift change, the
court determined it to be good cause attributable to Dakota Drug,
Inc., even though it resulted in no increase or decrease in hours. 82
Making this determination, the court concluded that if Newland
was found to have made a good faith effort to preserve her
employment by exercising a good faith effort to find child care,
benefits should be awarded.'
The trial court's order was reversed and the case remanded
for determination of the child care issue.1 4
TAXATION
SPEEDWAY, INC. V. JOB SER VICE NORTH DAKOTA
In Speedway, Inc. v. Job Service North Dakota, the North
Dakota Supreme Court held that a restaurant was required to pay
job insurance taxes on income earned by restaurant manager,
even though the manager's only income was from percentage of
profits under an oral lease agreement.68
Speedway opened a restaurant and lounge in Minot.6" 7 Under
an oral lease agreement, Shirley Struckness leased the restaurant
.from Speedway for $3,200 a month, plus 75% of monthly net prof-
its over $800.68 In 1987, Job Service issued a determination
requiring Speedway to pay job insurance taxes on Struckness'
income.689 Speedway appealed the determination, claiming that
Struckness was simply leasing the business from Speedway, and
679. Newland, 460 N.W.2d at 120.
680. Id. at 121. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 52-01-05 (1989) (providing a declaration of
public policy concerning involuntary unemployment in North Dakota); N.D. CENT. CODE§ 52-06-02 (1989) (describing when a person is disqualified from receiving benefits).
681. Newland, 460 N.W.2d at 122.
682. Id.
683. Id. at 124-125.
684. Id.
685. 454 N.W.2d 526 (N.D. 1990).
686. Speedway, Inc. v. Job Service North Dakota, 454 N.W.2d 526 (N.D. 1990).
687. Speedway, 454 N.W.2d at 527.
688. Id. Struckness was responsible for managing the restaurant operations and
received the first $800 of monthly net profits and additional 25% of all additional profits.
689. Id.
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therefore the percentage of profits received by her was not subject
to taxation.690 Although an appeals referee agreed with Speed-
way, the Executive Director of Job Service concurred with the ini-
tial decision.691 Speedway then appealed to the district court,
which upheld the Executive Director's determination.6 92 Speed-
way appealed to the North Dakota Supreme Court.69 z
Speedway asserted that job insurance taxes were not required
on Struckness' income because she did not fall under the definition
of a person who performs services "for wages or under any con-
tract for hire.' 694 Interpreting the statute, the North Dakota
Supreme Court determined that the phrase "contract for hire" did
not have substantially the same meaning as wages, as Speedway
argued.95 Because Struckness managed the corporation's busi-
ness and received a share of the business profits in return, the
court concluded that Struckness was an individual who performed
services under a "contract for hire," and her income was, there-
fore, subject to job insurance taxation.69 Direct payment of wages
or salary from employer to employee is not required for services to
become subject to job insurance taxation.6 97
The judgment of the trial court was affirmed.698
VENDOR AND PURCHASER
SECURITY STATE BANK OF HANNAFORD v. HARRINGTON
In Security State Bank of Hannaford v. Harrington,69 Burt
and Ruth Harrington sold 480 acres of farmland to their son, Ger-
ald, and his wife, Nancy,under a contract for deed.7°° The farm-
land consisted of two parcels, one located in Griggs County and
the other in Foster County.70 1 Gerald farmed the land with Secur-
ity State Bank (Security), providing operating expense loans.70 2 In
return for the financing, Security requested a first mortgage on the
690. Speedway, 454 N.W.2d at 527.
691. Id.
692. Id.
693. Id.
694. Speedway, 454 N.W.2d at 528. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 52-01-01(17 Xe) (providing
that "[s]ervices performed by an individual for wages or under any contract for hire must
be deemed to be employment subject to North Dakota unemployment compensation law").
695. Speedway, 454 N.W.2d at 528.
696. id. at 528-30.
697. Id.
698. Id. at 530.
699. 452 N.W.2d 72 (N.D. 1990).
700. Security State Bank v. Harrington, 452 N.W.2d 72 (N.D. 1990).
701. Harrington, 452 N.W.2d at 73.
702. Id.
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Foster County property. °3 In order to comply with Security's
request, Burt and Ruth Harrington conveyed legal title to the
property to Gerald. 0 Security acquired a first mortgage on the
property and also took a lien on Gerald's vendee interest in the
contract for deed on the Griggs County property.70 5 When Gerald
later defaulted on his loans, he conveyed the Foster County prop-
erty to Security.7° Security then foreclosed its lien on the Griggs
County property and brought action against Burt and Ruth Har-
rington for specific performance of the contract for deed.7 °7 The
Harringtons counterclaimed, requesting cancellation of the con-
tract.70 8 The trial court allowed the cancellation, subject to Secur-
ity's right to redeem for the price of the unpaid balance of the
contract for deed.7° Security appealed.710
Security first asserted on appeal to the North Dakota Supreme
Court that the Harringtons were barred by a ten-year limitation
period set forth in section 28-01-42 of the North Dakota Century
Code from cancelling the contract for deed. 71' Looking to the lan-
guage of the statute, the court found that section 28-01-42 clearly
and unambiguously provided a twenty year statute of limitations
and, therefore, the Harrington's action was not time barred.71 2
Security next asserted that the redemption amount set by the
trial court should have been reduced to reflect the Harringtons'
conveyance of the Foster County property to Gerald, because it
essentially destroyed their vendor's lien on that parcel.713 The
North Dakota Supreme Court found that the conveyance was con-
ditioned on Gerald's continued payment of the full contract price,
therefore, the Harringtons' vendors lien was retained on the
Griggs County property.1 Concluding that as assignee, Security
had no greater right of redemption than Gerald, the court upheld
the redemption amount set by the trial court.71 5
703. Id.
704. Id.
705. Harrington, 452 N.W.2d at 73.
706. Id.
707. Id.
708. Id. at 74.
709. Harrington, 452 N.W.2d at 74.
710. Id.
711. Id.
712. Id. See N.D. CENr. CODE § 28-01-42 (1988) (relating to the time limitation for
bringing an action to cancel or enforce a contract for the sale or conveyance of real estate).
713. Security, 452 N.W.2d at 74-75.
714. Id.
715. Id. The redemption amount reflected the full unpaid balance of the contract for
deed plus interest.
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The judgment of the trial court was affirmed. 1
WORKERS COMPENSATION
PLANTE V. NORTH DAKOTA WORKERS COMPENSATION
BUREAU
In Plante v. North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau 717
the North Dakota Supreme Court held that a workers compensa-
tion claimant could not pick and choose benefits in two different
states in order to get highest possible compensation.71 8
Curtis Plante was injured in North Dakota while employed by
a Minnesota construction company.7 9 He applied for and col-
lected temporary disability benefits from the North Dakota Work-
ers Compensation Bureau until he returned to work.720 When he
found himself unable to continue to work, he filed a workers com-
pensation claim in Minnesota for temporary total disability bene-
fits, permanent partial disability benefits, and medical expenses.72 '
Minnesota settled with Plante for $20,000, which represented ben-
efits for 10.5% permanent partial impairment and for three
months of temporary total disability benefits.7z Plante then filed
in North Dakota for benefits not offered in Minnesota.72 3 The
North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau denied benefits on
the basis that Minnesota benefits were not supplemental to his
North Dakota benefits.72 4 Upon rehearing, the Bureau found that
Plante waived entitlement to North Dakota benefits when he
accepted the Minnesota award, with the exception of medical ben-
efits.72 The district court affirmed the Bureau's decision.72 6
Plante appealed.72 7
Plante argued on appeal that the Minnesota settlement was
supplemental to North Dakota benefits within the meaning of sec-
tion 65-05-05 of the North Dakota Century Code, because the ben-
716. Id.
717. 455 N.W.2d 195 (N.D. 1990).
718. Plante v. North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau, 455 N.W.2d 195 (N.D.
1990).
719. Plante, 455 N.W.2d at 196.
720. Id.
721. Id.
722. Id.
723. Plante, 455 N.W.2d at 196-197.
724. Id. at 197. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-05 (1985) (prohibits compensation unless
benefits received from another state are supplemental to North Dakota benefits).
725. Plante, 455 N.W.2d at 197.
726. Id.
727. Id.
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efits were in addition to benefits received.72 s The North Dakota
Supreme Court rejected Plante's argument, finding Plante's Min-
nesota award to be distinct and separate, rather than in addition
to, the North Dakota award.729 Furthermore, the court found that
Plante would have received greater benefits than contemplated
by either state's workers compensation plans if he was allowed the
requested benefits. 730 Although an employee may file in the state
that provides the most desirable benefits, he may not pick and
choose the highest benefits in each state.731
The decision of the district court was affirmed.732
728. Id.
729. Plante, 455 N.W.2d at 198.
730. Id. at 199-200.
731. Id. at 200.
732. Id.
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